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

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D.

DUTY

OF

OFFICERS

COMMANDING

DETACHMENTS IN THE FIELD.

By JOHN ORMSBY VANDELEUR,

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF THE 8TH, OR KING'S ROYAL IRISH LIGHT DRAGOONS.

LONDON:

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ALL the military books which I have read except thoſe on drill or formation, appear to me to be more calculated for the inſtruction of generals, than officers in leſs elevated ſituations, not poſſeſſing that minute detail, which ſeems neceſſary for thoſe who are to perform the ſubordinate detached duties; but particularly thoſe who have not had an opportunity of ſerving before an enemy in the field. For my brother officers of this deſcription, this little treatiſe is intended; to them, I flatter myſelf, it may be of ſome uſe, during their firſt campaign, while it is humbly ſubmitted to the peruſal of thoſe of more experience, from whom I expect that the indulgence due to my intentions will prevent a too juſt criticiſm.

I have chiefly compiled it from approved German and French writers, not adhering to their words, but endeavouring to apply the principles (by them laid down) to ſmall detachments; what little I have ventured

to

to add from my own obſervations will, I hope, be found conſonant to thoſe principles, and to the preſent practice. If I have touched upon duties above the ſphere of thoſe for whom I profeſs to write; it muſt be recollected, that to occupy our extenſive colonies, the army is divided into ſeveral corps, each of which requires the ſame operations and details as a great army, and that conſequently the ſervice which in Europe is conducted by a general officer, will in America, or the Cape of Good Hope, devolve on one of much leſs elevated rank; and though the troops under his command will be fewer, yet the principles are the ſame.

Books referred to in the Marginal Notes.

* MILITARY Inſtructions attributed to the *King* of *Pruſſia.*

Turpin—Eſſai ſur l'Art de la Guerre.

Boſroger—Principes de la Guerre.

Lindenau—Winter Poſterungen, or a Treatiſe on Winter Campaigns.

An excellent Treatiſe written in German, comprifing Mathematics, Fortification, Gunnery, Tactics, and the Art of War, written by Mr. *Mauvillion*, Captain of the Corps of Noble Cadets at Heſſe Caſſel, for the Uſe of the Young Gentlemen of that Corps.

And *Templehoffe*—Tranſlated by the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel *Lindſay.*

* I have quoted part of Military Inſtructions verbatim, to ſhew that the reſt of the Treatiſe agrees with them in principle.

Only having Extracts which I took from *Turpin* by me, I cannot page him.

DUTY OF OFFICERS

COMMANDING

DETACHMENTS IN THE FIELD.

Of Picquets in General.

AN army in the preſence of an enemy muſt always have troops detached in front and on its flanks, to ſecure it from ſurpriſe and the fatigue which would otherwiſe be occaſioned by conſtant alarms. Thoſe detachments are generally compoſed of light troops, cavalry or infantry, or both, according to the nature of the country; and the poſts they occupy are called out-poſts.

For the ſame reaſon that the army detaches troops to occupy the out-poſts, ſo muſt each out-poſt detach parties for its own immediate ſecurity. Thoſe parties are called piquets,* and are ſometimes commanded by a field officer, but generally by a captain, a ſubaltern, or a ſerjeant; a piquet is the epitome of an out-poſt, as the latter is of an

* I have adopted the term *piquet* as that moſt uſed in our ſervice.

army, and detaches vedettes or ſentries for its own ſecurity.

A piquet is the firſt command of importance that will be entruſted to a young officer; upon his diligence and prudence on this duty, depends not only the fate of the poſt which the piquet covers, but eventually that of the whole army; he therefore cannot be too circumſpect.

When an army marches into a new poſition, the arrangement of a piquet is often left to the officer who commands it, he who poſts him not having ſufficient time to reconnoitre the ground minutely. When a young officer is ſo circumſtanced, the few rules herein contained may be of uſe to him.

Of Cavalry Piquets on a Plain.

A CAVALRY officer mounting a piquet on a plain muſt viſit all the vedettes in perſon, make them repeat the counterſign and orders, which they have received, and ſet them right if they have miſunderſtood them; he muſt examine the ground minutely, and obſerve that every vedette can ſee thoſe poſted on his right and left and the intermediate ſpace, and that the flank vedettes ſee thoſe of the next piquets; ſo that nothing can paſs between them without their knowledge: if there is any ſpace not commanded by ſome of the vedettes, he muſt ſupply the defect by poſting one there, and report it when relieved. He muſt then ſend out

out ſmall patroles to the neareſt commanding ſituations towards the enemy; and every precaution being thus taken for his ſecurity, he will order half the horſes to be fed, and when they have done, the other half; but on no account muſt more than half be unbridled at the ſame time: the dragoons may at the ſame time ſit down at their horſes heads, and in their ranks, and refreſh themſelves with the proviſions which they have brought with them in their canteens and haverſacks; but making fires muſt be avoided as much as poſſible, as the ſmoke would ſerve as an index to the enemy; except in a village or farm houſe, where it is confounded with that of the inhabitants; but at night it ſhould never be allowed, except the ſeverity of the weather renders it indiſpenſibly neceſſary, and then in the loweſt and moſt concealed ſituations.

It would be well to move the piquet at night a little to the right or left, ſo that a patrole of the enemy, having learned from ſome ſpy or deſerter, where it was poſted in the day, and coming at night, expecting to ſurpriſe it, may be taken in flank: in ſuch a caſe no firing muſt be allowed, but the piquet muſt obſerve the moſt profound ſilence to the moment that they charge; nor indeed ſhould a dragoon ever make uſe of his fire arms, except when ordered to ſkirmiſh, or as a vedette to give the alarm.

The vedettes muſt be frequently viſited and kept alert; they ſhould be double, in order that one may come in and report, ſhould any thing ſuſpici-

ous appear, which the commanding officer muſt himſelf verify, and ſend his report to the officer commanding the poſt from whence he is detached, if it ſhould be an enemy; but he muſt not make any report without firſt having aſcertained the fact in perſon.

The vedettes muſt keep up a conſtant communication at night by (one) riding gently to the right and left until he meets thoſe on his flanks, the other ſtanding ſtill, his carbine recovered.

If it can be afforded without harraſſing the men too much, there ſhould be two lines of vedettes, of which the firſt line might be ſingle. By day the firſt line ſhould be advanced two or three hundred paces in front of the ſecond, but drawn back at night ſo as to be ſeen by the latter; and all ſhould be drawn nearer to the piquet.

At ſun-ſetting and dawn the officer commanding a piquet ſhould make a patrole as far forward as he can, without riſking to be cut off by the enemy getting between him and his piquet.

All the horſes muſt be bridled at ſun-ſetting and remain ſo till clear day; the dragoons muſt lay at their horſes heads in their ranks, holding the bridoon rein all night.

In very cold or blowing weather, when men are moſt inclined to ſleep, the vedettes ſhould be relieved every hour, the two men poſted together at different times; by which method they are viſited by the relief every half hour: this ſhould be practiſed alſo very near the enemy, when half or one third of the piquet ſhould always be mounted.

If

If the piquet is a ſtrong one, commanded by a field officer or captain, he detaches a ſmall one in front, which furniſhes the vedettes, as the main body does the patroles. The patroles conſiſt of a non-commiſſioned officer, and two, three or four men, but an officer muſt frequently accompany them; their buſineſs is to keep the vedettes alert during the night, to advance beyond them, and endeavour by liſtening to diſcover if any thing approaches; for which purpoſe a man ſhould diſmount and lay his ear cloſe to the ground, by which means he will hear much further.

A communication muſt be kept up with the piquets on the flanks by patroles alſo. The commanding officer ſhould in the day point out to the officers and non-commiſſioned officers the roads which they are to patrole at night. Should the patrole fall in with an enemy of ſuperior force, they muſt endeavour to conceal themſelves from him behind ſome wall, hedge, or any thing that offers, let him paſs quietly, and immediately return and report.

Should the vedettes or patroles report the approach of an enemy, the commanding officer orders his piquet to mount, while he advances with a few men to reconnoitre. If he perceives him to be only a patrole and not in too ſuperior force, he immediately charges him with half or two thirds of his piquet, leaving the reſt in reſerve, to ſecond the attack or cover the retreat, as occaſion may require. But intelligence muſt be firſt ſent to the poſt from which the piquet was detached—Should

the darkneſs of the night prevent a poſſibility of aſcertaining the enemy's force by the eye, then he muſt be charged without heſitation: if he is only a patrole, he will probably be defeated, though double or treble the number of the piquet; as the party who attack boldly have always (but particularly at night) a conſiderable advantage over thoſe who are attacked. If on the other hand, it ſhould turn out to be a ſtrong column of the enemy, the charge will give the head of his advanced guard ſuch a check, that the piquet will have full time to retreat in good order, giving notice to the officer commanding the poſt from which it is detached, and to the piquets on its flanks; which notice will be communicated by them along the chain.

When the commanding officer of a piquet has defeated a party of the enemy, he muſt not purſue them with the whole of his party, but detach a few to make priſoners, who are not to venture farther than four or five hundred yards, and ſhould they fall in with his reſerve, they muſt immediately return to the main body.

The commanding officer muſt then re-poſt his vedettes who were driven in, and aſcertain by patroles that all is ſafe before he ſuffers his piquet to diſmount.

A piquet occupying new ground muſt not diſmount before the commanding officer has reconnoitred it minutely, and poſted the vedettes; at the relief, the commanding officer of the old piquet muſt ride round the vedettes and detached piquets, if

if there are any, with his ſucceſſor, and give him every information in his power.

The officer commanding a piquet makes all his arrangements before he diſmounts his men; ſuch as telling off his diviſions, appointing officers and non-commiſſioned officers to command them, ſkirmiſhers, &c.

If the piquet is ſtrong enough, it ſhould be told off in three diviſions; the firſt attacks, the ſecond ſupports it, and the third is left in reſerve; but there muſt always be a reſerve, be it ever ſo ſmall; at the ſame time that the firſt diviſion attacks the front, the ſecond falls upon the flank and rear. Even a few piſtol ſhots fired, in the rear of the enemy, will alarm him for his retreat.

Should the enemy appear in ſuperior force in the day light, the commanding officer (having made his report) ſhould make the greateſt diſplay of his force, while he is yet diſtant, in the manner laid down by H. R. H. the DUKE of YORK, in his inſtructions to the cavalry on the Continent of Europe in the year 1793, which are to be found at the end of General D. Dundas's book of Cavalry Manœuvre, until he receives further orders.

As there might be ſome broken ground, or other impediment, which would render an expeditious communication in the ordinary way difficult between ſome of the piquets, the officers going on that duty would do well to agree upon ſome ſignal to convey the intelligence, in caſe any of them ſhould be obliged to retreat: for inſtance, lighting a fire, or a particular ſound of the bugle; this is

only neceſſary when the piquets are advanced a conſiderable diſtance in front of the poſt.

All patroles and reliefs muſt conſtantly examine their girths, arms, and ammunition, before they go out, and a general examination muſt take place at day break, as the horſes will have emptied themſelves during the night.

A piquet of cavalry poſted on the banks of a river ſhould be covered from the view of the enemy at the other ſide, and protected from his fire by a hill, mound of earth, clump of trees, &c. but houſes muſt be avoided, as they encreaſe the danger of a cannonade inſtead of being a protection; if the river is fordable or has a bridge, a vedette ſhould be placed on the other ſide, the vedettes poſted along the bank muſt command the whole courſe of that part of the river entruſted to the piquet.

Should an enemy attempt to paſs, the piquet ſhould prevent him from forming and eſtabliſhing himſelf, by conſtantly charging him, until orders arrive in conſequence of the report that has been ſent off on his firſt appearance.

In action a party of cavalry is poſted five or ſix hundred paces in the rear of artillery for its protection, the officer commanding ſuch party muſt keep his eye upon the gun or guns under his protection, and advance as they advance; ſhould the enemy's cavalry approach them, he muſt likewiſe draw nearer, ſo as to be able to charge him, ſhould he make any attempt on the guns; ſhould he advance ſkirmiſhers, ſkirmiſhers ſhould be advanced againſt them; but the main body kept ready

to

to charge. If the guns retreat, every thing muſt be riſked for their preſervation, and the enemy muſt at all hazard be reſiſted until they are unlimbered and ready to fire, (or in a place of ſafety) when the party will again take poſt in the rear.

Of Cavalry Piquets in an incloſed Country.

HAVING detailed the duties of the commanding officer of a cavalry piquet on a plain, the next thing to be conſidered is that of one poſted in an incloſed country.

In ſuch a country the piquet generally conſiſts of both cavalry and infantry; however, caſes often occur when it will be neceſſary to poſt piquets, conſiſting of the former only in ſuch a country.

For inſtance, a plain intervening between the piquet and the poſt from which it is detached, would render the retreat of infantry extremely difficult in the event of a ſerious attack; therefore it is ſometimes abſolutely neceſſary to poſt a piquet conſiſting of cavalry only in ſuch a country.

Suppoſe the ſpot choſen for the picket, that where two or more roads meet leading to the territory occupied by the enemy; the commanding officer, on his arrival on the ground, orders a non-commiſſioned officer and two or three privates to advance three or four hundred paces on each road and take poſt; he then takes a few men with him (leaving the reſt mounted) carefully reconnoitres thoſe

thoſe roads, and poſts his vedettes, taking care to chooſe the ſpots which command the moſt extenſive views towards the enemy. If an officer relieves another, he is not at liberty to remove vedettes from the ground on which he finds them, but he may add as many as he thinks neceſſary for the ſecurity of his piquet, without harraſſing his party too much; reporting the addition which he has made when relieved.

The vedettes ſhould be double: it would be deſirable that they could be ſeen by the piquet; but as the windings and turning of the roads, with hedge-rows on the ſides, may prevent that; a continuation of vedettes, each ſeeing the next to him, muſt occupy the intermediate ſpace; thoſe laſt may be ſingle; as they cannot ſee one another at night, they muſt ride gently (except the advanced one, who ſtands ſtill looking towards the enemy) backwards and forwards until they meet thoſe in their front and rear. Vedettes alway carry the carabine recovered and ready to fire. Without thoſe precautions, in an incloſed country, infantry, creeping behind the incloſures, might get behind the vedette and ſurpriſe the piquet.

The commanding officer, having poſted his vedettes, ſends out his patroles, diſmounts his men, and orders half his horſes to be fed as before.

Should an enemy approach, he advances with half or two thirds of his piquet to reconnoitre, leaving the reſt in reſerve; the leading diviſion muſt advance with as great a front as poſſible, ſo as to occupy the whole breadth of the road, that it may

may not be out-flanked; the others follow in file as much on the ſide of the road as they can, to leave room for the firſt to retire if neceſſary, while they form up to the front and cover the retreat alternately. That part of the piquet left in reſerve, ſends out patroles on the other roads in the mean time, but not more than five or ſix hundred paces,* and takes a poſition on the road ſide, to cover the retreat of the other diviſions by charging the purſuing enemy in flank; taking care not to expoſe its own at the ſame time.

If the commanding officer, upon reconnoitring the enemy, does not find him too ſuperior in number, or ſupported by infantry, he charges him boldly; but muſt not commit himſelf in the purſuit; allowing only one diviſion to follow; and that with caution, leſt there ſhould be infantry in the rear, behind the incloſures. Having repulſed the enemy, he inſures the ſafety of his piquet by patroles, and repoſts his vedettes, before he ſuffers his men to diſmount. But ſhould he perceive the enemy to be in very ſuperior force, or ſupported by infantry, he muſt immediately retreat in a gentle trot, leſt the latter running along inſide the incloſures ſhould gain his flank. The cavalry muſt be kept at a reſpectful diſtance by ſkirmiſhers.

He of courſe gives notice to the poſt in his rear before he begins to retreat.

If there are any roads in his rear, leading to

* If thoſe patroles advanced too far, they might be cut off if the piquet retreated.

piquets

piquets on his flanks, he will communicate with them by patroles; and leſt they ſhould retreat without giving him notice, and leave his flanks expoſed, he will detach ſmall piquets or vedettes on thoſe roads at a proper diſtance, to prevent any ſurpriſe from that quarter; as he paſſes thoſe roads, in retreating, he will withdraw thoſe piquets or vedettes, who will join his rear guard.

It would be well to dig a ditch on each of the roads leading to the enemy, in front of the advanced vedette, it ſhould be about four feet deep and ſix wide, the excavated earth, thrown inward, will make a breaſt-work four feet high, at one end of which there muſt be a ſpace left ſufficient for a horſe to deſcend into the ditch, and a ſlope made for him to reaſcend at the other ſide, and at the oppoſite end of the ditch from that on which he deſcends. This conſtruction renders it much leſs acceſſible to an enemy, than if the paſſage was ſtraight acroſs the ditch. This paſſage is left for the patroles, which muſt be more frequent as the view is not ſo extenſive as on a plain; ſhould the commanding officer have reaſon to ſuppoſe that a patrole is cut off, he muſt immediately report it.

If tools for digging are not to be had, ſtrong buſhes laid acroſs the road, the branches projecting outwards, ſhould be ſubſtituted for the ditch; they ſhould be made faſt with ſtakes, ſix and a half feet long, pointed at both ends, ſunk diagonally two feet in the ground, and alſo projecting outwards; if ſtakes cannot be procured, the buſhes muſt be made faſt with ſtones, a paſſage muſt be left at one end

end for the patroles, which the officer or non-commiſſioned officer commanding them muſt always ſee ſtopped when they re-enter.

A cavalry officer being ordered to take poſt at a village, ſhould keep it in his front, poſting vedettes beyond it, whoſe poſition and that of the whole piquet, he ſhould change after dark, leſt any of the inhabitants ſhould have given information to the enemy. In all ſituations he muſt remember not to ſuffer any perſon to paſs outwards without a regular paſſport: the reaſon of keeping it in front is, that the enemy's infantry might enter it by the gardens, and cut off the piquet if in front of the village. If there is a ſteeple or any other building, commanding an extenſive proſpect, he muſt poſt an intelligent man on the top, and mount there frequently in perſon; the man may be withdrawn at night, unleſs any of the enemy's poſts are ſo near as to be ſeen from it, or in fine, unleſs his remaining there can be uſeful.

When an enemy approaches a poſt, and either from the cloſeneſs of the country, or darkneſs of the night, a thick fog, or any other cauſe, his force cannot be aſcertained by the eye, he muſt be *felt*, in order to make a true report; and this is attended with little or no danger; as ſo circumſtanced, a ſmall party may (after penetrating into the midſt of the advanced guard of a column) make its retreat in good order, in a country which is known to its officer, and even annoy and retard the enemy by its ſkirmiſhers.

An

An out piquet of cavalry muſt never be ſuffered to get into ſtables or barns; they could not turn out quick enough either to attack the enemy or to retreat.

Cavalry muſt always make, never wait for the aſſault, but they are not to quit their poſt for that purpoſe; one or two intelligent men muſt have orders not to engage in any melée, but be ready to carry any report which may be neceſſary; as what was at firſt ſuppoſed to be only a patrole, may turn out to be a ſtrong column of the enemy.

Of Mixed Piquets.

AN officer commanding a piquet, compoſed of both arms, ſhould obſerve all the precautions recommended in the foregoing inſtructions for cavalry. He will take notice if there are any bye paths by which infantry might approach, and poſt ſentries on them, and vedettes on the high roads; if he is poſted on a plain, the cavalry muſt be in front, and the infantry cover themſelves by any hedge, ditch, wall, thicket, or ravine in the rear.

If a wood is in front, or on the flank, it muſt be carefully reconnoitred by patroles of infantry, who penetrate the thickeſt part of it; and double ſentries be poſted on all the paths leading through it towards the enemy; all which ſhould be fortified by abatis's, at one ſide of which a paſſage muſt be left for the patroles, to be ſtopped when they re-enter.

If

If the piquet is ſtrong, ſmall detached piquets of a non-commiſſioned officer and three or four men ſhould be poſted on the paths; if the wood is a ſmall one, vedettes from the cavalry are poſted at the other ſide, on the plain, and the roads; and thoſe ſmall infantry parties in the iſſues of the wood. The cavalry vedettes are withdrawn at night. In thoſe ſituations cavalry are for the moſt part attached to the piquet merely for the purpoſe of patroling.

The commanding officer having poſted his detached piquets, vedettes, &c. aſſigns their ſtations to the different troops.

If the poſt is on a road, a ditch is made as before mentioned, and guarded by a party of infantry, having a cavalry vedette advanced to give notice of the enemy's approach; the vedette retreating ſtoops on his horſe's neck, as he deſcends into the ditch, that the infantry may fire over him, if purſued. The flanks muſt be ſecured by ſmall piquets of infantry, in the fields, on each ſide behind the incloſures; but if the piquet is a ſmall one, ſentries only muſt be ſubſtituted. The cavalry are poſted in the rear of the infantry, and ſend out frequent patroles. Behind the incloſures, at one ſide of the road and in front of the ditch above mentioned, ſome infantry ſhould be ſent to fire on the enemy in flank when he advances to diſlodge the guard from its entrenchment. Upon the firſt notice of his approach, a ſmall patrole of infantry, commanded by a non-commiſſioned officer, whoſe reports can be depended upon, muſt be

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ſent forward on his flank to reconnoitre. Should it be neceſſary to retreat, the ſmall detached parties are called in and formed in the rear of the cavalry, with the body of the piquet; the party that guarded the entrenchment follow and do the ſame, a party of infantry is then thrown behind the incloſure on the ſide of the road, who cover the retreat of the dragoons in their turn; but whom they muſt be careful to let paſs before they fire on thoſe of the enemy; after which the dragoons will charge, and the two arms thus alternately cover each other's retreat, while the enemy continues to preſs with his cavalry; ſhould he bring up artillery, or infantry in ſuch force as to endanger the ſurrounding and cutting off of the piquet, then the two arms muſt ſeparate, the cavalry gaining the poſt in its rear in a trot by the road, and the infantry through the fields, by the bye ways, which of courſe, have been previouſly reconnoitred. Should the piquet have more cavalry than is ſufficient for a rear guard, that is to occupy the breadth of the road with its front, the reſt may precede the infantry on its retreat.

If the piquet is poſted in a village, the cavalry remain in the rear, ditches as before deſcribed will be made at all the iſſues towards the enemy, and guarded by infantry, the reſerve of which will be kept in ſome central ſituation. Should want of time, or any other impediment, prevent the making of ditches or abatis's, waggons filled with dung may be ſubſtituted. Sentries muſt be poſted on all the paths leading through the gardens to the

the country, and vedettes in front of the infantry guards at the entrances.

Should the enemy approach in the night, the infantry muſt defend the avenues where they are poſted; but muſt not purſue him when repulſed; but patroles ſhould be ſent out to aſcertain whether his retreat be real or not. If he is only a patrole, he will retreat upon finding the piquet alert; but if it appears by the weight of his fire, or the vigour of his attack, that he is in force, the retreat muſt be made in the greateſt ſilence and good order, the cavalry charging any of thoſe of the enemy who may dare to approach. If the night is very dark, the cavalry will not cover the retreat, as the noiſe of their horſes would inform the enemy where to direct his fire. In the day time, a few infantry poſted in houſes at the end of the village, next our own army, will effectually check the purſuit of cavalry by their fire from the windows, which will be ſeconded by the charge of the cavalry; this infantry may rejoin its party by the lanes or paths leading through the gardens to the rear; all of which ſhould be reconnoitred on firſt taking poſſeſſion of the poſt.

When a mixed party of both arms is to defend any redoubt, or other work, the infantry occupy the work, and the cavalry take poſt at ſome diſtance in the rear, covered from the view and fire of the enemy as much as poſſible; ready to charge him ſhould he attempt to ſtorm the work, and ſeize any artillery which he may advance againſt it.—To take a gun, a few men are detached, who gallop

up on its flanks in file, cut down the gunners, and force the drivers away with them; their retreat is covered by the reſt of the party, who trot up in good order to ſupport them.

If the work is to be abandoned, the cavalry cover the retreat.

When an officer, commanding an advanced piquet, hears any firing of guns, or ſees any duſt, or any thing elſe, which indicates an enemy being in motion, he immediately reports it to his ſuperior. —It is very eaſy to diſtinguiſh, by the quantity of duſt, whether the party that occaſions it, is a ſtrong one or not.

A piquet ſhould always be as much concealed from the enemy as poſſible; but ſhould be able to ſee him at a great diſtance by means of its vedettes: for inſtance, if a hill is the poſt, the party ſhould not be on the ſummit, where it would be conſpicuous, but a little behind it, and the vedettes advanced.

An officer commanding a piquet (where one can be procured) ſhould always have a waggon ready to carry off any man who may be wounded.

Cavalry, poſted on a plain, with infantry behind a ditch, hedge, or ravine, or in ſome thicket in its rear, ſhould endeavour to draw any enemy, who advances to attack it, under the fire of the latter, and charge him immediately after he has received it.

Infantry Piquets.

AN officer of infantry eſtabliſhes his piquet behind a wall, hedge, ditch, or in a houſe, or village, and adds as much to the ſecurity of his poſt as his time will permit, by abatis's, &c.; and, in fine, he will take all the precautions recommended to cavalry, and mixt piquets. As he has not cavalry with him, he muſt ſubſtitute ſentries in the moſt commanding ſituations in the day time: thoſe may be withdrawn at night; and thoſe only continued on the paths by which the enemy can approach, and not farther advanced than is neceſſary to give information. If he is poſted in a houſe, he will conſtruct a ſmall fleche or redoubt outſide the door, the fire of which will croſs that from the lower windows, outſide which (if they are low) ditches will be dug, (and the excavated earth thrown againſt the wall, not to afford cover to the enemy). —Thoſe ditches are to prevent him from firing through the lower windows into the houſe, the end of the fleche or redoubt muſt not join the wall of the houſe, but a paſſage be left open at each ſide for the patroles. To cover thoſe paſſages, traverſes will be thrown up, joining the wall of the houſe, and projecting four or five feet from it.— But for the defence of houſes, the reader is referred to *Principes de la Guerre*, by *Mons. de Boſroger.* On the Conduct of Infantry Piquets poſted in in-

terſected Countries, Woods, and Villages, enough has been ſaid under the head of *Mixed Piquets.*

An officer commanding a piquet on a river's bank, ſhould conceal it from the enemy behind ſome hedge, clump of trees, or ſome other covert, and poſt his ſentries ſo as to command a view of the river, to the next piquets on his right and left; he ſhould cauſe them to be frequently viſited and kept alert, and ſhould keep up a communication with the piquets on his flanks by patroles.

When a party of infantry retreats, it ſhould avoid open ground, and keep near hedges or other incloſures, by which it can be protected from cavalry. If a piquet of infantry is poſted on a plain, (which cannot happen except where the army is deſtitute of cavalry,) the officer commanding it muſt conſtruct a redoubt or abatis for his ſecurity; for which reaſon, every officer, particularly of infantry, ſhould underſtand practical field fortification, which is extremely ſimple and eaſy to be learned. It is to be underſtood, that a piquet, whether of cavalry or infantry, is never to quit its poſt on any account whatſoever, except when compelled by ſuperior force: but, having repulſed the enemy, it immediately reſumes its previous poſition. This is not to prevent a few dragoons from being detached in purſuit to complete the defeat, and make priſoners; but, as before ſaid, they muſt not venture too far.

The piquets of the advanced guard and outpoſts are generally relieved about an hour before dawn, that they may be doubled at that time when

when the enemy moſt commonly makes his attack.

As by the negligence of ſome of the piquets, an enemy may have ſlipped between two of them, the commanding officer of a piquet ſhould ſend patroles to his rear, as well as his front and flanks.—It is not meant by any thing that has been here ſaid, that a piquet is to reſiſt a very ſuperior force; but that it is to know that force to be ſuperior before it retreats, in order not to haraſs unneceſſarily the corps from which it is detached, by ſuffering it to be diſturbed by every little patrole.

OUT-POSTS.

HAVING conſidered piquets in every ſituation, out-poſts, which differ from them only in conſiſting of more men, and not being ſo frequently relieved, naturally follow.

The commanding officer of a detachment of light troops ordered to occupy an out-poſt, detaches ſmall piquets of cavalry on all the roads in front and on his flanks, before he ſuffers the dragoons to diſmount, or the infantry to quit their ranks; he then reconnoitres the ground minutely, aſſiſted by ſome of the inhabitants (if there are any), and orders the detail of piquets according to the nature of the poſt. If it is night when he arrives with his detachment, or too late in the day to examine the ground minutely, the troops muſt lie on their arms all night; half the horſes only muſt be unbridled at

a time to feed. As ſoon as he has reconnoitred the ground perfectly, and has poſted his piquets on all the roads, by which the enemy might approach his poſt, he puts it in the beſt ſtate of defence, by conſtructing abatis's and entrenchments wherever they appear to him neceſſary, and placing his artillery in the moſt advantageous ſituations for ſweeping the principal avenues. If he has orders to maintain his poſt as long as poſſible, he muſt conſtruct a good redoubt in the rear, there to make a laſt ſtand with the infantry and artillery, while the cavalry, at a convenient diſtance, take every opportunity of ſeconding their efforts by occaſionally charging the enemy. A ſituation which is not commanded muſt be pitched upon for the redoubt; and every thing within ſix hundred paces of it, which might ſerve to cover an enemy, muſt be removed or deſtroyed. Wigwams muſt be built in a dry ſituation for the men; the horſes of the cavalry muſt be ſaddled, and thoſe of the artillery harneſſed at ſunſetting, and remain ſo all night; and the men muſt ſleep in their clothes. If the poſt is in an open country, piquets of infantry are poſted in the moſt convenient ſituations for them—ſuch as in thickets, or behind walls or ditches, and cavalry in their front upon the plain: if in a village, the men muſt be kept as much together, and as near their alarm-poſts, (which muſt be aſſigned them) as poſſible.—Infantry guards, poſted at all the entrances, which muſt be traverſed or abatiſed; the reſerve kept ready in the church, or ſome large houſe in a central ſituation. If the village is a ſtraggling one, with many

entrances

entrances or openings, which cannot be all guarded without dividing the detachment too much, they muſt be rendered difficult by abatis's, ditches, &c. in paſſing which the enemy will break and get into confuſion; in which ſtate he will be charged by parties ſent againſt him from the main body, which remains in a central ſituation. The horſes of the cavalry and artillery are piqueted, and the men in tents or wigwams near them. If the water for the horſes is diſtant, only one-third muſt be watered at once; the ſame rule applies to forage. If there is any high corn or bruſh-wood in front of the poſt, ſome infantry may be placed in it, on the approach of an enemy, to gall his flanks; but there muſt be a bye path for their retreat. Ambuſcades may alſo be poſted in front of the piquets from time to time, who, firing upon the enemy's cavalry patroles, will teach them to keep at a more reſpectful diſtance; if they can be ſeconded by cavalry to make priſoners, it will be ſo much the better. Bofroger, page 181.

The commanding officer of an out-poſt ſends out frequent patroles towards the enemy, and reports any intelligence which he has learned from them to the general officer commanding the out-poſts, or the adjutant-general, in his daily report. From twelve to twenty dragoons will in general be ſufficient for one of thoſe patroles. If they have to paſs through a wood which has not piquets at the other ſide; light infantry muſt be attached to them, who march on the flanks, and remain on the far ſide until the return of the dragoons from reconnoitring. If a wood in front of a poſt is not too Lindenau, page 129.

extenſive, infantry piquets ſhould be poſted at all
Turpin. the entrances at the other ſide, and cavalry on the plain in their front. If it is too extenſive to puſh piquets beyond it, they muſt be poſted at the entrances on the near ſide, and cavalry on the open ground in their rear; but if the near ſide is too near the poſt for the piquet, that is, too near for the purpoſe of previous information of an enemy's approach, they muſt be advanced into the wood without cavalry. If the poſt is on the ſide of a river where there is a ford or bridge, it muſt be fortified with a redoubt or fleche, and guarded by infantry ſentries poſted on the banks, and cavalry vedettes advanced at the other ſide.

When a detachment is obliged to retreat, the different arms mutually ſupport each other; the cavalry cover the infantry on the plain, and the defiles are occupied and defended by the latter until the former have paſſed them; the artillery fire from every convenient ſituation. If a bridge is to be paſſed, the artillery and infantry firſt take poſt on the oppoſite banks of the river, and cover by their fire the retreat of the cavalry; but the bridge ſhould not be deſtroyed without orders from the general; as its deſtruction might be an obſtacle to retaking the poſt, or advancing patroles of diſcovery. It would be the means of preventing confuſion, if the commanding officer communicated to thoſe neareſt to him in command, the order in which he meant to retreat, as ſoon as he had made his arrangements for the defence of his poſt.

A redoubt conſtructed for the defence of an out-

poſt

poſt ſhould be open to the rear, to prevent it from being uſeful to the enemy, if taken, except it is ſo ſituated that he can turn it without being expoſed to its fire. A church-yard may ſometimes be eaſily converted into a redoubt, and the vaults would be ſafe magazines for the powder. A ditch ſhould be dug round on the outſide, and the earth thrown inwards to ſtrengthen the wall, which ſhould be reduced to four and a half feet high on the inſide, by banquettes. Fleches ſhould be built in front of each face, forming angles with the wall, of not more than 110, and not leſs than 90 degrees; their own jutting out angles ſhould not have leſs than 60 degrees. Shells might be buried in front of the ſaliant angles, or other weak parts, one or two feet under ground, to which trains of powder might be conveyed from the ditch by means of covered channels lined with wood.

The commanding, and all officers at an out-poſt, ſhould conciliate the friendſhip of the inhabitants, as they may be the means of procuring uſeful intelligence: he ſhould alſo endeavour to gain ſome of thoſe in his front, who might give information to his patroles, and agree with them upon ſignals, by which to inform him of the motions of the enemy. The patroles ſhould not go to the houſe of ſuch inhabitant, but he ſhould meet them at a place appointed. When there is any danger of their being intercepted, they ſhould be ordered to return by a different route from that which they took going out, and parties ſent to meet them. Lindenau, page 122.

A young officer ſhould not be ſuffered to command

mand an out-piquet or patrole, until he has been ſeveral times on thoſe duties with thoſe of more experience. The commanding officer ſhould be particular in inſtructing the officer who commands a patrole in the object of it, and the route he is to take, and order him to ſend back a dragoon when he has got three or four miles beyond the piquets: if the dragoon does not return within a reaſonable time, it is to be preſumed that the party is cut off, and an attack may be expected. The cavalry muſt therefore bridle up, the infantry ſtand to their arms, all the avenues be carefully patroled, and a report ſent to the general.

Lindenau, page 132.

When the army retreats, the officer commanding an out-poſt ſhould redouble his vigilance, as the enemy will probably be more enterpriſing. His piquets ſhould be withdrawn with ſilence and regularity, and the men be prevented from burning their wigwams, or making any ſort of fires; alſo, from plundering or ill treating the inhabitants, as their friendſhip (putting motives of humanity out of the queſtion) may be of great advantage in caſe the army ſhould again advance. It is almoſt unneceſſary to add, that the out-poſts ſhould keep up a communication with each other by patroles or intermediate piquets. If the detachment has to retreat over a plain where there is danger of being attacked by a more numerous cavalry, it appears to me that the infantry would do well to provide themſelves with ſtakes from ſix to ſeven feet long, pointed at both ends, which, planting diagonally before them, they would find a great defence againſt the charge of the enemy,

enemy, who, being repulſed by them, would be completely defeated by the dragoons.

When an out-poſt is occupied by both infantry and dragoons, the horſes may be ventured in barns where the doors are wide, as the reſiſtance of the infantry guards at the entrance will give them time to get out—but never in ſtables. If by cavalry only, they muſt be at piquet, and the men at their heads.

[Annexed is a Drawing, copied from Military Inſtructions, attributed to the King of Pruſſia, to illuſtrate the Poſition and Duty of Out-poſts.]

PATROLES

ARE made from piquets, to keep their vedettes and ſentries alert, to give notice of the approach of an enemy, and to keep up a communication with the piquets on the right and left: they conſiſt of a non-commiſſioned officer, and three or four dragoons, on the plains and roads; and of light infantry, in woods and mountains, where the former cannot act. An officer, generally accompanies them at ſunſetting and dawn, and puſhes forward as far as he can without riſking to be cut off. If a road is to be paſſed by the patrole, a man muſt be previouſly detached to reconnoitre it minutely; but an infantry

try patrole muſt not advance where it is liable to be attacked by cavalry.

If thoſe ſmall patroles ſee any thing of an enemy, a report is immediately ſent to the officer commanding the piquet, by a well-mounted man, and the reſt retreat; the non-commiſſioned officer halting to make further obſervations, whenever he can with ſafety.

A ſecond claſs of patroles is made from an outpoſt, by order of its commanding officer: it conſiſts of, from twelve to twenty dragoons; and is commanded by an officer, who inſpects the arms, appointments, and ammunition of his party, and ſees that his men have their neceſſary forage and proviſion. Before he marches off, he orders an advanced and rear guard, each conſiſting of three or four men: the advanced guard precedes the party twenty or thirty yards, and detaches one man a like diſtance in its front. They carry their carabines or piſtols recovered. The rear guard marches in the ſame order, reverſed, and faces to the rear at every halt: flankers are detached on the plain in the ſame manner. In a very broken intricate country, as in mountains, where frequent ravines and defiles occur, the firſt man ſhould be advanced four or five hundred paces, and the other two or three, divide the ground between him and the party in ſuch a manner that every man can ſee him who precedes him: the rear guard does the ſame. The party muſt march with great circumſpection, halting at every defile until the firſt man has paſſed it, except where its length is ſuch as to occaſion

Lindenau, page 123.

caſion too much delay. All roads and paths croſſing, or branching from the route which the party takes, muſt be carefully examined before they are paſſed, and intelligent men ſent to obtain a knowledge of their direction, not only leſt they ſhould conceal an enemy, but as they may ſerve for at leaſt ſome of the party to return home by, in the event of it being obliged to ſeparate, which nothing but abſolute neceſſity can excuſe. If the patrole is to paſs through a village, an inhabitant muſt be taken out of the firſt houſe, and queſtioned before any of the party enter it; if it contains any of the enemy's infantry, it muſt be avoided by ſome circuitous rout; but ſhould he give information of a ſmall cavalry patrole being in it, and that they are ſo negligent as not to have poſted a vedette outſide, they will be eaſily ſurpriſed: for this purpoſe the advanced guard muſt be called in, and the inhabitant being taken as a guide, the party enter the village in full gallop, cutting down every one who attempts to reſiſt or eſcape. Even ſhould there be a vedette, if he is ſo badly poſted or negligent that the party can enter the village cloſe at his heels, the ſurpriſe will be complete, and priſoners made, who may give uſeful information. The retreat muſt then be made without loſs of time; the priſoners diſarmed in front. Should the party be preſſed cloſely by the enemy, any horſes which cannot be preſerved from him muſt be diſabled or killed. Should a patrole be obliged to paſs a hill, it halts until the advanced man has reconnoitred from the top. Should there be any wood-

land

land or ravines, and no infantry attached to the party, two or three men muſt be diſmounted to examine them minutely before the reſt venture to enter.

A patrole is not ſent out for the purpoſe of fighting, but that of gaining intelligence; therefore, an officer commanding one, muſt always keep in mind the object of his miſſion, and not go out of his road to attack or purſue any ſmall party of the enemy, whoſe object may be to lead him into an ambuſcade. But ſhould he fall in with him in ſuch a ſituation that he cannot well avoid him, nor form a judgment of his force, either on account of his local ſituation, a fog, or its being in the night, he ſhould charge him without heſitation; if it is only a patrole, he will be ſure to defeat it, though conſiſting of ſuperior numbers: the party which attacks boldly having always a conſiderable advantage, but particularly in ſuch a ſituation where the inferiority cannot be readily perceived. But as, contrary to expectation, the party ſo fallen in with may be the head of a ſtrong column of the enemy advancing to attack our poſts, and the patrole be cut off, the officer commanding it muſt be prepared for every event, and warn an intelligent dragoon not to mix in any conflict, but gallop back with the information which may have been already gained.

Lindenau, page 133.

When a patrole comes to a place where two or more roads meet, the commanding officer halts, and detaches intelligent men to the moſt commanding ſituations to reconnoitre them: it is a

principle

principle that patroles ſhould ſee as much, and be ſeen as little as poſſible. Therefore high ground muſt be avoided by the party; but intelligent men detached to look out from it, in woody or intricate countries. When a patrole conſiſts of cavalry and infantry, a proportion of the latter muſt march on the flanks, and examine minutely every ravine, &c. The reſt march upon the road or path, preceded by one or two dragoons, with their carabines or piſtols recovered, and followed by the cavalry; thoſe advanced dragoons are flanked by infantry. The march is cloſed by a rear guard of infantry, followed by one or two dragoons at proper diſtances, who are alſo flanked by infantry. On the retreat, the order of march is the ſame reverſed. Lindenau, page 129.

On arriving at the outward edge of the wood, the infantry take poſt, while the cavalry proceed to the neareſt heights on the plain to reconnoitre. Should the latter be preſſed by a ſuperior force, the former cover their retreat through the woody country. They ſhould keep themſelves as much concealed as poſſible during the abſence of the cavalry, and not appear to the purſuing enemy until they have given him their fire. If the patrole is to retreat by another route, the infantry march to it through the wood, or along its ſkirts, while the cavalry are reconnoitring the plain and roads in front; during which time they muſt conceal themſelves as much as poſſible, and make no fires, but poſt ſentries all round, keep a ſharp look out, and detain any inhabitant who has ſeen them. A dragoon

ſhould

should be left with them to carry any information which may be neceſſary, whether to the cavalry or the poſt from which the patrole is detached. If attacked by cavalry when advancing, the infantry are formed on the ſide of the road; and having given a fire, the cavalry immediately charge while the infantry again gain the enemy's flank. If by both arms in ſuperior force, the infantry cover the retreat of the cavalry through the thickets and intricate parts of the country, who in their turn form upon every open ground, and repel the enemy, until the infantry have gained ſome thicket or ravine in the rear: but, if the patrole having fulfilled its object, can make good its retreat without fighting, it will be much more to the credit of the officer who commands it. It may be neceſſary, for the ſafety of the party, to ſeparate, the infantry retreating by bye paths, and the cavalry, in a trot on the road or plain—but they muſt never blow their horſes by galloping.

Patroles of fifty, a hundred, or more dragoons are ſent out by the general commanding the advanced guard, in an open country, and commanded by a field-officer or captain.—They are generally ordered to proceed by a certain route, and to a certain point.

The commanding officer of ſuch a detachment would find underſtanding the language of the country, (or at leaſt having ſome perſon who underſtands it with him) a very great advantage: he ſhould ſtop and queſtion every one he meets, and employ every poſſible method to gain intelligence; and

Boſroger, page 130.

and at the ſame time uſe every precaution, for the ſecurity of his party, marching with an advanced, a rear guard, and flankers, at a ſufficient diſtance to give him time to form on the approach of an enemy; thoſe guards detach two or three men in their front and rear in the manner already directed for ſmall patroles. At night or during a fog, a chain of communication is eſtabliſhed between the advanced, rear guard, and the main-body, by means of ſingle dragoons riding one after the other, ſo that each ſees the man who precedes him; the ſame rule is obſerved with regard to the flankers. The commanding officer ſhould not venture his party into any road or defile, until it has been paſſed and reconnoitred by his advanced guard. He ſhould never diſmount his men without firſt poſting vedettes, and ſhould obſerve the moſt advantageous ſituations in which to engage; ſhould he find it impoſſible to avoid a conflict with a party of the enemy in ſuperior force to him, to one of which he ſhould retreat on firſt perceiving him. He muſt not enter any village with his party, until he has ſent in a truſty non-commiſſioned officer or officers, and three or four men, to bring out one or two inhabitants whom he muſt queſtion minutely; if it is neceſſary to paſs through, in order to gain the wiſhed-for information, and ſhould it be occupied by a party of the enemy's cavalry, he muſt not heſitate in attacking them though ſomewhat ſuperior to him in number; but the inhabitants who give the intelligence muſt be kept as a ſecurity for their veracity. The advanced guard Turpin.

endeavours to enter the village with the enemy's vedettes, the main body follows in a round trot, and the reſerve remains outſide to cover the retreat if neceſſary; a place of rendezvous ſhould be indicated to the whole, in caſe a ſeparation ſhould be unavoidable. It would be well to ſend parties to enter by different ways at the ſame time, if it could be done without detaching too much; a few men ſhould be left on the roads outſide, to prevent the eſcape of the fugitives; this being effected, the commanding officer advances with a few men to the moſt convenient ſituation for making his obſervations, which muſt be done as quickly as poſſible, the main body at the ſame time takes a poſition at the head of the village, to cover his retreat, and the rear guard with the priſoners remain behind it; all the avenues muſt be carefully patroled in his abſence, ſo that no enemy can approach without timely notice being given to every part of the detachment, and every precaution be taken to prevent any inhabitant from leaving the village. The reconnoitring finiſhed, the retreat muſt be made with all poſſible diligence, halting to feed only where the vedettes can command an extenſive proſpect, and even then only half the horſes will be unbridled at once.

Seeing the piquets of the enemy, together with the information to be obtained from the inhabitants of the country, is as much as is generally expected from the parties here treated of. But it will be ſometimes neceſſary for them to do more; for inſtance, the general wiſhes to make priſoners,

in

in order to compare their intelligence with that of his ſpies, or for any other purpoſe, and ſignifies his commands to the officer deſtined to command ſuch a detachment, to advance by a particular route to the firſt enemy's piquet in that direction, and endeavour to cut it off, and make priſoners. The commanding officer muſt endeavour to gain intelligence on the march by queſtioning the inhabitants, but in ſuch a manner as not to let them penetrate his intentions; if he finds one who ſeems well acquainted with the circumſtances which he wants to be informed of, he takes him as a guide, guarding him carefully, but treating him with gentleneſs, promiſing to reward him if he gives good and true information: but threatening him with immediate death, ſhould he deceive him. When he arrives at the diſtance of about a quarter of a mile from the vedettes, he halts the party, who keep the moſt profound ſilence while he advances accompanied by the guide and three or four dragoons, and endeavours to reconnoitre the piquet without being obſerved, he then makes his diſpoſitions accordingly, detaching a party to fall on the rear by a *detour*, if poſſible, while the reſt attack in front, but ſhould the vedettes diſcover him when reconnoitring, he muſt not heſitate immediately attacking. If the rear of the picquet cannot be gained, he ſhould form an ambuſcade into which ſome of the piquet will be drawn by a feigned retreat, and endeavour to make priſoners; when his object being effected, he will immediately retreat before day light ſhall diſcover the ſmallneſs of his party.

Boſroger page 161.

If the enemy's poſition is to be aſcertained, and he has a piquet poſted on ground which may be ſuppoſed to command a view of the camp or out-poſts, it muſt be immediately diſlodged; if at night a ſmall detachment ſhould be detached to turn his flank and fall upon his rear, while the main body charge him in front, when being alarmed leſt he ſhould be ſurrounded and cut off, he will retreat, and leave the patroling officer at liberty to effect his purpoſe. The fires burning at the enemy's out-poſts, and at his grand guards in front of his camp, ſufficiently denoting his ſituation, while the officer is making his obſervations he is covered by a chain of ſkirmiſhers, who divide the ground at the diſtance of 100 or 150 paces in his front, and on his flanks; the rear guard in the mean time keeps a ſharp look out, and the main body remains a little behind him, ready for any emergency.

If the buſineſs is to be done by day-light, a ſmall party follows the main body in the charge, *en echellon*, and wheels up at the moment of the ſhock, to turn the enemy's flank; the officer then, beſides his general obſervation of the poſition, reconnoitres the neareſt poſt minutely, and takes down his remarks in writing if he has time.

But if the patrole can ſlip between the piquets of the enemy, by ſome path which has been neglected by him: the officer muſt (having made his obſervations) endeavour to retreat out of the chain before day; but if he finds that impracticable, he ſhould conceal his party in a wood, and at a diſtance

tance from the road, till night; he ſhould poſt ſentries in the trees to look out, and diſmounted dragoons round, as well to prevent the men from ſtraggling, as to reſiſt on foot in caſe the party ſhould be attacked. This is a perilous ſituation; perhaps it would be better to endeavour to eſcape by attacking ſome of the piquets in the rear and cutting your way through them.

If the ſituation from which the enemy is to be reconnoitred, is in a woody country, the patrole will probably conſiſt of both arms. In order to drive the enemy's piquets from it, the infantry attack the flanks in the wood, while the dragoons clear the road; if there is a ditch acroſs it, the dragoons do not advance until the infantry have driven the guard from it, who will certainly retreat as ſoon as its flank is gained. Having cleared the ground from which he is to reconnoitre, the officer forms a chain of infantry advanced 500 or 600 paces in front and on his flanks, which keeps the enemy at a diſtance by its fire: theſe infantry cover themſelves as they can from the fire of the enemy; the reſt of the party are put out of the reach of muſketry, and keep a ſharp look out to the rear and flanks, poſting guards, and patroling any roads by which the enemy might approach. Lindenau, page 148.

The officer in advancing through the country ſhould take particular notice of every inch of ground, and attack and defend it in imagination, poſting both cavalry and infantry in the moſt advantageous ſituations for their reciprocal ſupport; ſo that ſhould he fall in with a party of the enemy Boſroger, page 131.

on his return, he ſhould be immediately able, and without the leaſt heſitation, to form his arrangement and put it in execution.

A patrole, when preſſed by an enemy in its retreat, ſhould endeavour to gain a wood or defile in its rear, as the enemy will not venture to purſue it into ſuch a place, without taking precautions which will delay him, and give us time to gain a great deal of ground; however, if he ſhould venture at once through it, the party ſhould face about at the other ſide, and charge him before he can form. If ſmall parties of infantry have been left to guard the entrances of the defiles, the retreat will be ſecure.

Some writers recommend mounting infantry behind dragoons on patroles; but it ſhould never be done except on very particular occaſions indeed, as it would render the horſes unable to act. The French practiſed it very much this war.

An officer commanding a patrole, ſhould never halt in any village, nor ſuffer any of his men to enter into houſes; if they are in need of refreſhment, ſome ſteady men are ſent under a ſerjeant or quarter-maſter to procure it.

When a patrole comes to a wood, which is likely to be occupied by the enemy, the infantry advance through it, and the cavalry remain formed on the plain ready to cover their retreat. No ſafe opportunity of feeding the horſes ſhould be miſſed on the patrole, as it anſwers the double purpoſe of refreſhing them, and lightening their load; but the

Military Inſtructions, page 240.

the forage muſt be œconomized, ſo as to laſt during the time which the party is to remain out.

It is a maxim, that in retreating, infantry always form to occupy the entrance of a defile, and cavalry at the other ſide having paſſed it. Military Inſtructions, page 240.

When it is an object with an officer to cut off a patrole of the enemy (which muſt depend upon his orders) he ſhould, if ſuperior to him, endeavour to conceal that advantage from him, to draw him into an advantageous ſituation by retreating before him, while he detaches a party by a *detour* to cut off his retreat. If the patrole is a mixed one, the local ſituation of courſe will determine whether the party detached will conſiſt of cavalry or infantry, or of both; but if the enemy is ſuperior, and a conflict cannot be avoided, the commanding officer muſt decide at once and form his party, not omitting any local advantage whatſoever, but above all things ſecuring a retreat: in ſuch a ſituation his character and exiſtence depend upon his coolneſs and preſence of mind. Our light dragoons being mounted on ſo much ſtronger horſes than any others, can always cope with very ſuperior numbers of any enemy, if equally officered. Mauvillion, page 54.

An officer commanding an advanced or flanking party on a march of the army, and falling in with a patrole of the enemy, immediately ſends a report to the general, and endeavours to cut it off, that it may not carry home the intelligence of our movement, at all events he muſt keep it at ſuch a diſtance as to prevent it from forming any judgment of our force.

An officer going on any detached duty, ſhould examine the appointments and amunition of his party before he marches off, and ſee that his men have a proper quantity of forage and proviſions.

All officers, but particularly of light troops, ſhould ſpare no pains nor expence to acquire an accurate knowledge of the country which is the ſeat of war; they ſhould procure the beſt maps, and from them conſtruct more particular ones on a large ſcale, which is done in the following manner.

After having marked on the map, the place where you are as centre, you deſcribe a circle of ſix or eight miles. You then trace on paper another circle five or ſix times larger, but ſtill ſuppoſed to be ſix or eight miles; its diameter divided will ſerve as a ſcale for placing exactly the towns, villages, &c. laid down within the circumference traced upon the map. You then aſcertain by enquiry if the diſtances in your map are right, and if not, you correct them: by enquiry and your own obſervations you will alſo be able to fill up the ſpaces between the towns, villages, &c. to trace the courſe of the rivers and rivulets, the poſition of hills, woods, moraſſes, &c. and to mark all the bye roads which are not laid down in the general map.

In order to lay down the bearings of the places contained in his map, the officer ſhould be provided with a pocket compaſs, without which he ſhould never go on a patrole, as without it in ſome countries it will be impoſſible to find his way; for inſtance,

inſtance, in a flat open country, where all the objects which preſent themſelves reſemble one another, or in a wood.

An officer making a patrole ſhould note in his pocket book, the features of the country through which he paſſes, and detail them to his commanding officer, if required, on his return—this is eaſily done as follows:

Patrole from the village A, to the town N. At one mile diſtance the road deſcends, on the right is a wood, on the left a vineyard. At two miles is the village of——, through which runs a rivulet (fordable or not for cavalry) over which you paſs on a (ſtone or wooden) bridge, at the other ſide is the ſame valley. At three miles the road aſcends and divides itſelf in two; on the right are ploughed fields, on the left a hill covered with vines. At four miles diſtance is the village B, containing about 60 or 70 houſes, it is of difficult acceſs, ſurrounded with gardens, hedges and other incloſures. At five miles the ground is even to the right, low and boggy on the left, covered with bruſhwood. At ſix miles the ground is boggy; on the right about a mile from the road is the village of C; on the left a heath of two or three miles extent. At ſeven miles begins a great foreſt, the wood not thick, but the road very bad. At eight miles is the town of N, ſurrounded by an old wall, and contains about 500 houſes.

This is ſufficient to explain the method, which is within the capacity of any corporal.

Concerning

Concerning the manner of Reporting; extracted from Military Inſtructions, attributed to FREDERICK *the Great.*

Page 243.

VERBAL reports being often inaccurately delivered, it is always moſt adviſable to ſend them written; for this reaſon, an officer on duty ſhould never be without paper and pencil in his pocket; in caſes that require immediate diſpatch, you may ſend a verbal report firſt, which you ought to confirm by a written one as ſoon as poſſible.

In all reports you muſt endeavour to be explicit, yet conciſe, and without any other title at the top, than the place, the day and the hour.

An officer upon an out-command, after having reported facts and appearances, may be permitted to ſubjoin his conjecture concerning the intentions of the enemy, and may alſo indicate the manner in which he propoſes to act.

All reports ſhould be ſealed; but where diſpatch is required, they ſhould not be retarded on that account. Officers ſhould accuſtom themſelves to write reports without diſmounting. Officers for their own credit ſhould be very careful how they report things of which they are not ſufficiently informed, and ought by no means to omit contradicting their intelligence as ſoon as they diſcover their miſtake.

The

The Conduct of an Officer ſent out to Reconnoitre with a Command, conſiſting of Infantry, Dragoons, and Huſſars.

Military Inſtructions, page 239.

THE huſſars, who are to reconnoitre on both ſides of the road as they proceed, are to be advanced about a quarter of a league before the cavalry; which, if in an open country, muſt march in the centre, followed by the infantry, alſo at the diſtance of a quarter of a league.

If the enemy is encamped in an open country, it is better to traverſe the plain with your cavalry only, and to poſt your infantry at the laſt defile, ready to ſtop the enemy, in caſe your cavalry ſhould be purſued in the retreat.

If after having marched a conſiderable diſtance you perceive nothing of the enemy, and that it is neceſſary you ſhould penetrate a wood, or paſs a defile, in order to have a view of his ſituation, though it may be attended with ſome danger; in this caſe you halt your cavalry in the plain, and paſs the wood or defile with your infantry only; your cavalry will form, in the mean time, ready to cover the infantry in caſe of a precipitate retreat. It is an invariable rule for cavalry to rally behind a defile, not before it. If you take care to ſecure the paſſes as you proceed with ſmall guards of infantry, there is no danger of ſuffering in your retreat.

On

Military Inſtructions, page 241.

On Military Deception.

HAPPENING to fall in with a party of the enemy of ſuperior force, it is often more adviſable to ſtand your ground than to make a precipitate retreat: your apparent reſolution will ſtagger the enemy; and by carefully magnifying your party, you may probably perſuade him to move off.

In the firſt place you muſt extend your line by ordering your rear rank to double, and form upon one wing, while the other muſt be ſo ſituated as to turn upon ſome wood or inclofure, ſo that its extremity may not appear. You will march a couple of horſes between each diviſion, which will appear to draw your field pieces.*

Your cavalry muſt form a rank entire, with a couple of files upon each flank of two deep; but nothing will deceive the enemy ſo effectually as your ſeeming reſolution to engage. In the mean time you muſt detach part of your infantry to ſecure the neareſt defile in your rear; the reſt may then move off gradually, with orders to quicken their pace as ſoon as they have got out of ſight of the enemy; and having given them ſufficient time to reach the defile, your cavalry may retire as expeditiouſly as they pleaſe.

* The infantry are here ſuppoſed to be three deep; but were they only two deep, the line might be extended by taking away half the men from the rear rank, and leaving the other half to cover only every ſecond man of the front rank.

The

The Duty of an Officer commanding a Detachment of Huſſars or Dragoons, poſted in a Village near the Army, whether encamped or in Cantonments.

THESE detachments being poſted for the ſecurity of the army, the commanding officer will take every imaginable precaution to prevent ſurprize.—Having received orders to take poſt in ſuch a village, his firſt care muſt be to cauſe it to be reconnoitred; but before his people enter the village, he is to poſt a ſmall party at the oppoſite ſide, to prevent the inhabitants from carrying intelligence to the enemy: in the mean time, till his patroles return, he may feed his horſes and refreſh his men, but without ſuffering any of them to ſtir from their horſes.

If, from the report of his patroles, he finds any unexpected defect in his poſition, he halts till he has reported the particulars, and his opinion of it, to the general.

Having taken poſt in the village, he ſhould take ſuch precautions for his ſecurity, that when his horſes are unſaddled, he may have a quarter of an hour's notice of the approach of an enemy; but, if ſaddled, eight minutes previous notice ſhould be ſufficient.

It is not expected that a huſſar ſhould defend his poſt againſt a ſuperior force, as in this ſituation his duty is to obſerve and amuſe the enemy. The ſervice

vice he is to render depends rather upon the diſpoſition than the ſtrength of his piquets, which ought to form a continued chain, ſo as to make it impoſſible for the enemy to approach without being obſerved.

Plate I. In the annexed Plate, there are three different ſtations:—No. 1. is a village, diſtant a * quarter of mile from the left wing of the army which is encamped near the town A C. In this village I have poſted four ſquadrons of huſſars. Upon the left runs a rivulet, over which there are three bridges, *a*, *b*, and *c*; *a* and *b* having no communication with each other. The right flank is covered by the poſts No. 2 and 3. At *a*, I poſt a ſerjeant and ſix men, who, having broken the bridge, poſts his vedettes ſo as to obſerve every thing that paſſes on the oppoſite ſide, and patroles conſtantly along the banks of the rivulet. This out-guard is detached from one, conſiſting of an officer and twenty men, at *d*, which relieves it every four hours.

This officer ſends out conſtant patroles, and reports to the commanding officer in the village.

I poſt another of thoſe out-guards at *b*, and alſo at *c*, which differ only from the firſt in that there is a village at the other ſide of the rivulet, of which the enemy may poſſibly take poſſeſſion, therefore I poſt a vedette on the height beyond the village, whom I withdraw at night, taking up a few planks of the bridge. As often as this piquet hears any unuſual noiſe in the village, ſuch as barking of dogs, &c.

* A German mile is about five Engliſh.

the

the ſergeant muſt report it to the officer from whoſe party he is detached. Theſe two piquets, which have a communication with each other, are detached from, and ſupported by the detachment *e*, which conſiſts of 38 men, under ſimilar orders as that at *d*. In this ſituation, when the patroles have paſſed the bridge, it ſhould be guarded by light infantry or diſmounted huſſars, who are to take up the planks as ſoon as the patroles have repaſſed.

Our flank being ſecured by No. 2 detachment, let us conſider the precautions neceſſary to be taken in the village.

Each entrance ſhould be barricaded by ladders faſtened to pikes drove into the ground, or by traverſes; but the road by which you mean to advance by waggons only, loaded with dung, which may be eaſily removed, which, in caſe of neceſſity, may ſerve as a parapet, behind which, to make a good defence; you will poſt at each entrance a corporal and four men, and the reſerve in the centre of the village. If there ſhould not be a ſufficient number of barns in the village, part of your horſes muſt ſtand in the open air, it being by no means adviſable to croud horſes into ſtables, the doors of which will admit only one at a time. Your horſes muſt be ſaddled at ſun-ſet, at which time the reſerve turns out

Thoſe who have been permitted to unſaddle their horſes, muſt take care that their appointments are ſo placed that they may find them in the dark. It is a fault to fatigue your people without cauſe; therefore,

fore, if you have any heights in your neighbourhood, you may eaſe the corps by diminiſhing the piquets and vedettes in the day time, in clear weather. If you have infantry, you will poſt them ſo as to defend the entrance of the village till your huſſars are ready to receive the enemy; in this caſe your horſes may be unſaddled in the day time.

No. 2 is a village on the plain, whoſe left is covered by No. 1, and its right by No. 3, and a moraſs, the front is entirely open. In the village, I will ſuppoſe, you have poſted four or ſix ſquadrons. —The poſt A is occupied by a captain and forty, and B by a ſubaltern and thirty: they detach ſmall parties to C, D and E, who communicate with each other by patroles. Thoſe detachments, on the firſt attack, fall back on the piquets from which they were advanced, who muſt alſo retire to the village, ſhould the enemy appear formidable. On the other ſide of the village I poſt an officer and twenty-eight men at F, who detaches a ſerjeant and eight to G.

Poſts of this nature are conſiderably ſtrengthened by a mixture of infantry, and even a few field pieces, which are placed at the entrance of the village in the day time, and in the church-yard at night.

At No. 3 is a village near a wood, through which are ſeveral roads: here I poſt two piquets at *a a*, and *b b*, which are to ſend out frequent patroles, and to continue mounted all night.

It is unneceſſary to guard the entrance of this village,

village, as it may be approached on every ſide. If you have no infantry, it would be better to retire into the plain during the night. A party of light infantry would be very uſeful, if properly poſted in the wood; but their retreat over the plain would be extremely difficult.

Conduct of the Commander of a Regiment, Squadron, or Detachment of Huſſars in Winter Quarters.

THE diſpoſition within his quarters is the ſame as before directed; but as neither men nor horſes can continue any time in the open air in that ſeaſon, he ſhould have a ſmall detachment of infantry ready to amuſe the enemy till the huſſars have time to bring out their horſes and mount: thoſe infantry are quartered at the extremities of the village, where they throw up fleches or redoubts for their ſecurity.

As in winter, there are ſome moraſſes which do not freeze ſufficiently to ſupport your patroles of huſſars, but which are paſſable for the enemy's infantry, you ſhould ſend out frequent patroles of infantry in the night, during the froſt.

[*End of the Extracts from Military Inſtructions by the King of Pruſſia.*]

FORAGING.

THOUGH with great armies in Europe this duty is generally entruſted to a general officer, when it is to be performed in the front, or on the flanks of the army, in order to ſpare the country in the rear; yet in our ſervice we are ſo much divided into corps, particularly in the colonies, that it muſt often devolve upon thoſe of leſs elevated rank; it may therefore not be amiſs to ſay a few words upon this ſubject.

The detachment for the protection of the foragers ſhould, if poſſible, march ſome hours before them, and form a chain of poſts of cavalry and infantry, through which nothing can paſs, either in or out, without being ſeen. Thoſe poſts ſhould ſend out patroles of dragoons, and poſt vedettes in the ſituations commanding the moſt extenſive proſpects, while parties of light infantry examine carefully all ravines, thickets, high corn, &c. &c. The commanding officer (if the chain is extenſive) ſhould divide his force; but if not, ſhould eſtabliſh himſelf with the main body in the moſt convenient ſituation for ſupporting all its parts. He ſhould not, however, be in too great haſte to advance with all his force to the aſſiſtance of any of his poſts, but merely to ſend ſuch reinforcements as appear neceſſary, as the enemy would probably make a falſe attack for the purpoſe of drawing him away from the point at which he meant to penetrate. Every precaution

Turpin.

precaution being taken, the foraging begins. If the forage is green, four men may be employed to one horſe; one holds him, another cuts the forage, and the other two bind and load. The foragers may be ſent home in detachments with officers or quarter-maſters, as faſt as they finiſh their buſineſs. Mauvillion, page 470.

The quantity that each horſe carries, and the average rate of each truſs, ſhould be ſpecified in orders, to which the officers muſt be particularly attentive: they muſt alſo ſee that they are tight, and not too large. A waggon will employ ten men, beſides the drivers, three of whom cut the forage, ſix bind and load, and one packs it on the waggon.

If the forage is dry, villages, ſtreets, hamlets, and farm-houſes are aſſigned to the different corps, and the quantity which they are to deliver, is given in writing to the commanding officer, and alſo marked with chalk on the doors by the commiſſary's aſſiſtants, or the quarter-maſters. The quantity which each ſack is to contain, ſhould be alſo ſpecified in orders.

An officer entruſted with a command againſt a forage, ſhould keep in his mind, upon this as well as every other occaſion, the main object for which he is detached—which (on the ſervice now treated of) is, to defeat the purpoſe of the enemy, by preventing him from foraging.

To this end, he ſhould be perfectly acquainted with the intention and movements of the enemy, as his muſt be regulated by them. He ſhould know Mauvillion, page 505.

the time and place of the forage, and the number of troops which are to protect it. If the country is ſuch as will admit of it, he ſhould make ſeveral falſe attacks at the ſame time that he makes his real one; and wherever he breaks through the chain, ſome dragoons ſhould immediately fall on the foragers, diſperſe them, and ſeize as many horſes, &c. as poſſible.

If the enemy makes his retreat in good order, having firſt ſent off the foragers, he ſhould be followed a ſufficient diſtance to prevent them from returning to their work that day; but if he ſhould keep his ground, in ſpight of every effort to drive him from it, he ſtill ſhould be kept in a ſtate of alarm, to prevent the foraging as much as poſſible; but the officer who commands the detachment ſhould remember, that a reinforcement may arrive from the enemy's camp, and therefore be on his guard againſt ſuch an event.

As green forage is generally collected on a plain, cavalry are ſent to prevent it; but not, however, without ſome infantry to ſupport them. If the enemy is ſo incautious that an ambuſcade can be formed, he will be eaſily defeated. But againſt dry foraging in villages, infantry are ſupported by a few dragoons. The officers and quarter-maſters commanding the foragers, muſt be very attentive to prevent ſtraggling or waſte, and to preſerve good order and ſobriety, as upon ſuch occaſions more men are loſt by irregularity than any thing elſe.

The gentlemen of the quarter-maſter-general's, and commiſſary's departments, ſhould make themſelves

ſelves acquainted with the average produce of the land in the country, where the army is to act, ſo that when ordered to reconnoitre that where the forage is to be collected, they may have nothing to do but to meaſure the fields, by pacing their horſes along two ſides of them, which being multiplied the one by the other, gives the ſurface, and the average produce being known, and one third allowed for failure, waſte, &c. they are aſſigned to the different corps according to their ſtrength.

The gentlemen of thoſe departments, and dragoon officers, ſhould alſo be able to judge, by meaſuring them, the quantity of grain, hay and ſtraw contained in the ſtacks or barns.

CONVOYS.

AS the loſs of a convoy muſt be productive of the greateſt inconvenience to the troops, for which it was intended, too much attention cannot be paid to this ſubject; and, where it is liable to be attacked, there is no ſervice which requires more attention and addreſs than the conduct of one. Lindſay, from Templehoff, page 216.

When we conſider the length of road which a hundred waggons will require, and the time which it takes to park them—what muſt be the difficulty of defending the march of ſome thouſands. One hundred waggons, with four horſes to each, in one row or column, with very ſmall intervals, will extend an Engliſh mile, allowing fifteen paces for a waggon and horſes; waggons with eight horſes will

cover one third more. In order not to fatigue the cattle unneceſſarily, the convoy ſhould be divided into brigades: ſuppoſe one thouſand waggons in five brigades of two hundred each, have orders to march at one o'clock, and that they can march at the rate of two miles an hour, as each brigade of two hundred waggons, with four horſes to each, covers two miles of road, the ſecond brigade cannot move in leſs than an hour after the firſt; and if they have all harneſſed and put to at the ſame time, the fifth brigade will have remained ſo for four hours without moving, which time would have been better ſpent in refreſhing the men and horſes.*

For the further preſervation of the cattle, the brigades might change places every day: for inſtance, the firſt leads to-day; the ſecond to-morrow, and ſo on, as thoſe who lead find the roads good and unbroken; but when ſome hundreds of waggons have paſſed, thoſe in the rear will find them very bad. If a waggon breaks down, it is drawn to one ſide, not to interrupt the line of march.

Before the convoy an advanced guard is ſent forward; its ſtrength is regulated by that of the eſcort, and its compoſition by the nature of the country. Its infantry occupy all the defiles through which the convoy is to paſs, or by which the enemy might approach, and its cavalry guard the plains. Patroles are ſent forward as far as they can go

Mauvillion, page 494.

* Therefore each brigade ſhould harneſs an hour after that which precedes it.

without

without too much riſk, to examine the country minutely.

A part of the eſcort marches at the head of the convoy, and furniſhes detachments to relieve thoſe left by the advanced guard on the flanks. Thoſe detachments are ſucceſſively relieved by the rear-guard, which they join. A reſerve marches with the centre to ſupport any part which may be attacked. When the eſcort has relieved all the detachments left on the flanks by the advanced guard, and the rear guard all thoſe of the eſcort, the waggons ſhould be drawn up, and parked; and the detachments which have been relieved ſent to the corps with which they ſat out. When that is done, the convoy may again proceed as before.

But it will be impoſſible, with a ſmall eſcort, to protect ſuch a line of march as a convoy muſt occupy, unleſs we have ſufficient previous information of the point which is menaced.

For this purpoſe we muſt take care—Firſt, That all the detached parties from the advance, rear and flank guards, do proceed a ſufficient diſtance towards the enemy, to give us timely notice of his approach; ſo that the waggons may be parked, and the eſcort formed to the beſt advantage before they can fall upon us; for which purpoſe, the detachments already mentioned are to oppoſe, and retard his march as much as poſſible, until they receive orders to retreat. Turpin.

Secondly, That when we come to a defile, the waggons muſt be drawn up and parked, until our patroles having advanced, and examined to a conſi-

derable diſtance, report that all is ſafe. When a ſufficient proportion of the eſcort having occupied the other ſide, the convoy may again drive forward; arrived at the other ſide the defile, the waggons are again parked until the remainder of the eſcort has paſſed, when they again drive on. The leading waggon ſhould be frequently halted to prevent the line of march from extending; and whenever the breaking down of a waggon, a defile, the badneſs of the road, or a hill, cauſes a halt at the head of the convoy, thoſe waggons that follow ſhould drive up and be parked at the ſide of the road, ſo that the rear waggons will ſtill continue advancing.—The horſes may be taken from thoſe waggons which are parked, to aſſiſt the leaders to paſs the obſtacle. Whenever the convoy halts for repoſe, the waggons ſhould be driven up, and parked in the form of a ſquare or oblong, within which the horſes are placed; and the eſcort is poſted between it and the enemy, at ſome defile, or other advantageous ſituation. It may be even neceſſary for the infantry of the eſcort to take poſt behind the waggons, when parked; but that would be a very dangerous ſituation. In ſome circumſtances, it would be prudent to ſacrifice a part for the preſervation of the reſt; but a defile between the convoy and the enemy will be the ſureſt protection. It is evident, that where danger is not to be apprehended, ſome of thoſe precautions would only retard the march.

Attack of a Convoy.

IF an ambuſcade can be formed with effect, it will be the beſt mode of attack, either againſt a convoy, or any other moving body: but in the preſent improved ſtate of the military art, it is almoſt impoſſible that it ſhould ſucceed. The troops of which it is compoſed ſhould be poſted at ſuch a diſtance from the road which the convoy is to paſs, that they may not be perceived by the enemy; for if his patroles do their duty, no cover can conceal them: they ſhould, nevertheleſs, be ſufficiently near to fall upon the eſcort before it can be formed, and the waggons parked. The ambuſcade has its outpoſts and ſentries, who keep as quiet and concealed as poſſible; detain every perſon paſſing, and cut off every party of the enemy which may have ſeen them; but thoſe who have not perceived them, are not moleſted. Mauvillion, page 510.

All attacks upon convoys ſhould be made with the greateſt vivacity, and at different points at the ſame time, to create the more confuſion. Wherever any troops penetrate, parties ſhould be detached to do as much miſchief as poſſible to the convoy. Over-turning a few waggons on the road, may be the means of cutting off thoſe in their rear.

Trifling diſadvantages of ground or numbers, ſhould not prevent the attack of a convoy, as much is to be gained, and nothing loſt, in caſe of a repulſe;

repulſe; the commandant being too well ſatisfied with the preſervation of the convoy to think of a purſuit. The officer entruſted with the command of the troops who are to attack, ſhould have a perfect knowledge of the ground, and the time that the convoy is to paſs. His march ſhould be conducted with all imaginable ſecrecy, detaching his advanced and flanking parties no farther than is abſolutely neceſſary for his ſecurity.

DETACHMENTS.

AN officer, detached to any conſiderable diſtance from the army, ſhould, above all things, take care of his communication, and the ſubſiſtence of his detachment: he ſhould preſerve the ſtricteſt diſcipline, and ſuffer no ſtraggling or marauding; he ſhould march with advanced, flanking, and rear-guards, proportioned to his force; he ſhould never paſs a defile without firſt having reconnoitred it, and aſcertained that he cannot be attacked before he has time to form at the other ſide. When paſſed, he ſhould halt the head of the column, to prevent it from lengthening. He ſhould never halt without taking the uſual precautions—as poſting piquets, vedettes, &c. and chuſing a ſituation where fuel and water can be eaſily procured, and which his detachment can act in, to advantage, if attacked.

If an officer obſerves theſe rules, and is of a cool,

but

but decided character, he may be unfortunate, but never can be diſhonoured.

I ſhall now cloſe this little treatiſe, with obſerving, that originally, it was not intended to exceed a few rules for piquets and patroles, for the uſe of the officers of the 8th Light Dragoons: but, that a love of employment, and the leiſure which I had in country quarters, induced me to prolong it to its preſent extent. If it can be of any uſe, by occaſioning ſome perſon, better qualified, to improve upon it, I ſhall not think that my time has been miſpent.

Expla-

Explanation of Plate II.

A, B, the camp, having its out-poſts in a country, partly woody, partly open and partly encloſed.—At No. I. are poſted two ſquadrons of light dragoons, and 400 infantry, who furniſh the following piquets.—At the cottage *a*, is an officer and 36 men; he detaches eight men under a non-commiſſioned officer to *c*, on the bridle road, and four men on each of the paths to *d* and *e*, and poſts two ſentinels at *f*, on the path leading to the great road in front of the village.—At *b*, are twelve dragoons under his command, who patrole the bridle road in his front, and cover his retreat over the open ground to the village.—At *g*, is a captain and fifty men; he detaches an officer and 20 men to *h*, and a corporal and ſix men to each of the paths, *i* and *k*, and two ſentinels to the path *f*.—At *l*, is a ſerjeant and twelve dragoons to communicate with the poſt No. II.—At *m*, is an officer and 20 dragoons, who may be retired behind the infantry at night, leaving vedettes.—At *n*, is a field work, to which the infantry retreat when forced from the village.

No. II. is occupied by two ſquadrons of light dragoons, and 100 light infantry. An officer and 30 dragoons are poſted at *p*; this officer poſts a ſmall party in his front, and takes care that his flank vedettes can ſee thoſe belonging to the piquets of No. I. and No. III.—A ſerjeant and twelve dragoons are poſted at *q*, to communicate with No. I. The infantry poſt ſmall guards at the entrances of the village.—No. III. having a plain in its rear has no infantry, although the country in front of it is encloſed; but is occupied by four ſquadrons of light dragoons.—A captain and 60 men are poſted at *r*; he poſts a ſubaltern and 20 men behind the village in his front at *s*, and a ſubaltern and 20 men on the bridle road at *t*, who alſo poſts a ſmall party in his front.—A ſubaltern and 30 men are poſted on the plain at *u*, and another and 20 men at the bridle road at *v*; they poſt ſmall parties in their front who remain bridled.—No. IV. is a field work to defend a bridge, *w* the infantry poſted in it, L, light cavalry to ſupport them, and cover their retreat; *x*, a piquet of infantry on the bridge; *y*, ſmall piquets of infantry upon the banks of the river in the encloſed fields; *z*, a piquet of cavalry to watch by its vedettes the bank where the country is open; B, a piquet of light dragoons on the other ſide of the river.

The officer who commands in a redoubt, ſhould have a reſerve of a third or fourth of his men to fill up the places of the killed, to carry ammunition to thoſe who are engaged, and to reinforce that part where the attack is hotteſt. He who attacks it orders a part of his men to jump into the ditch; if neceſſary, they are provided with hatchets to cut down the palliſadoes, and open a way while the reſt fire from the glacis.

Carriage


Carriage Road.

Bridle Road.


Foot Paths.

River.

Farm-Houſe or Cottage.

Village.

Cavalry.

Infantry.

Abatis.

Traverſe.

Vedette.

Sentinel.

Expla-

Explanation of Plate III. and IV.

The firſt repreſenting the March of a Convoy in an encloſed Country.—The laſt over a Plain.

PLATE III.

a. The convoy parked.
b. The convoy on its march.
c. The eſcort.
d. The advanced guard.
e. The rear guard.
f. Parties of infantry guarding the paſſes.
g. Parties of cavalry patroling in their front.
h. A place fixed upon for halting the convoy.

PLATE IV.

a. The convoy parked.
b. The convoy on its march.
c. The eſcort.
d. The advanced guard.
e. The rear guard.
f. Small detachments of Infantry poſted by the eſcort at 400 paces diſtant from each other, to defend the convoy.
g. Small parties of cavalry in front of them, and covering their intervals.
h. Parties of dragoons reconnoitring on the plain.

N. B. Colonel Templehoff recommends that a convoy ſhould not extend more than five miles, and that it ſhould be halted at that diſtance, until the laſt waggon is driven up.

He ſuppoſes the eſcort to conſiſt of 10,000 men. With a ſmaller eſcort, the halts will be proportionably more frequent.

" *foundation of every art, which is not governed by*
" *the imagination, equally neceſſary to a General*
" *and an Aſtronomer, and which formed a* Turenne
" *and a* Vauban, *as well as an* Archimedes *and a*
" Newton. *Adding to this the ſtudy of Hiſtory, with*
" *an exact knowledge of Geography, he obſerved,*
" *and formed himſelf by the example of the great*
" *men who had preceded him.*"

To him we owe, in a great degree, the preſent ſyſtem of tactics, ſince brought to perfection by Frederick *the* Great, *and lately introduced into the Britiſh army by the patriotic exertions of Lieutenant-General* Dundas.

In favour of the above deſtructive opinion, I have heard the ſucceſſes of the French armies this war adduced; but which, in my opinion, are rather arguments againſt it. A man who has received a liberal education, or who has been bred to any learned profeſſion, can eaſily apply himſelf afterwards to thoſe ſciences moſt neceſſary for that line to which his intereſt or inclination may lead him.—He who has been educated for a Lawyer may, without much difficulty, qualify himſelf for a Phyſician; and he who has received the education, which the accompliſhed Soldier ought to have, is equally fit (as far as learning goes) for any other profeſſion. Do not we ſee an Erſkine, *after having tried the Navy and the Army, triumph in a profeſſion, where abilities alone were ſufficient to raiſe him to fame and fortune.*

The officers who have figured in the ſervice of the French convention, were either lawyers, (a claſs, who, in every country, are obliged to receive a liberal edu-

vation) or elſe officers de genie—*Engineers and Artillery, a corps in which they had every opportunity of ſtudying the mathematical and mechanical parts of the profeſſion: and as the revolution opened a field to their ambition, it is natural to ſuppoſe that it would cauſe an extention of their reſearches, and Hiſtory would not refuſe her aid.*

With reſpect to the inferior officers, there could not be much difficulty in ſupplying them, when we know that, according the cuſtom of the French ſervice, every man was entitled to his diſcharge at the expiration of five years, that it was eaſily procured ſooner, that, conſequently, many enliſted for a frolick; or to learn to ride, fence *and* dance, GRATIS: *and, finally, that it was conſidered as a* feather *to* have ſerved.

This will be a ſufficient anſwer to thoſe who argue from the analogy of the French ſucceſſes, that numbers alone can do every thing, as they were able at once to form an army of trained ſoldiers.

I have heard the great Duke of Marlborough *adduced as an inſtance, that ſtudy is unneceſſary for an officer, as he was the moſt ignorant man of his day: but, by the ſame rule, it muſt be unneceſsary for a politician, for he was certainly the beſt of the age; and if he really was that ignorant man, we muſt allow that genius's do now and then appear who are created to ſurmount all difficulties.*

No man will undertake to make a pair of ſhoes without having taken ſome pains to learn his trade; yet we ſee ſome who do not heſitate to occupy ſituations, where, not only their own reputation, but the

the lives of many of their fellow creatures depend upon their profeſſional knowledge, without having ever once thought of qualifying themſelves, foolifhly ſuppoſing that bravery is the only requiſite of an officer.

Experience is allowed to be a good guide in every profeſsion; then why ſhould we neglect to take advantage of that of our predeceſſors, to copy their achievements, and take warning by their faults?

The Lawyer founds his plea, and the Judge his deciſion on the opinions of a Blackſtone, *a* Camden, *or a* Mansfield. *The Miniſter purſues the politics of a* Richelieu, *a* Fleury, *a* Walpole, *or a* Chatham. *The Phyſician too improves by the practice of his predeceſſors: and will the Soldier alone ruſh into the deſert without a guide or compaſs, and preſumptuouſly diſdain to profit by the talents and experience of a* Guſtavus Adolphus, *a* Maurice *of Naſſau, a* Spinola, *a* Turenne, *a* Marlborough, *a Marſhal* Saxe, *a* Ferdinand, *and a* Frederick.

It is, (after a competent knowledge of the military ſciences) by carefully ſtudying the Hiſtory of thoſe, and other great men, together with their orders, that an Officer is to be formed either to command a detachment or an army.

Let us now endeavour to trace ſome of the principal outlines of the Art of War, as practiſed by them.

ART OF WAR.

EVERY one knows that an army conſiſts of cavalry, infantry, artillery and engineers: I ſhall briefly proceed to explain their different uſes; beginning with the infantry, as the great body of the army.

It is divided into regular (or infantry of the line) and light infantry. In general the light infantry, in the German ſervices, are only raiſed for the war; they are compoſed of game keepers, and armed with rifles. Our light infantry companies attached to regiments, are neither trained nor armed for the ſort of ſervice for which troops of that denomination are intended.

Firſt principle.

As every individual, ſo has every body of men its chief ſtrength, either for attack or defence, in front. Therefore every body of ſoldiers ſhould be always ſo ſituated as to be able to oppoſe a front to the enemy.

Modes of fighting of the infantry.

The infantry forces its enemy to retreat by its fire, or charging him with the bayonet. The latter is but ſeldom practiſed, though peculiarly adapted to the Britiſh infantry.

Diſtribution of the infantry.

The infantry is divided into battalions (in our ſervice) of 800 rank and file, the flank companies being detached, which particularly if formed only two deep ſeem to be too extenſive a front. In the Pruſſian ſervice a battalion conſiſts of only 700

men including officers and muſic; and their grenadiers of only 520 privates, and they form three deep.

Uſe of infantry.

As infantry can be uſed with effect in all ſorts of ground, it may be looked upon as the ſoul of an army; but it muſt not be expoſed to cavalry on a plain, as it would certainly be deſtroyed, at leaſt as ſoon as it was attempted to be put in motion. But in broken ground, ſuch as mountains, woods, villages, behind hedges, ditches, rivers, moraſſes, and all ſorts of fortifications, it is equally uſeful either for attack or defence.

Upon hills, infantry ſhould be ſo poſted as to be able to defend the declivity by its fire, not quite upon the ſummit, much leſs behind it, as it would thereby be prevented from repelling the attacking enemy. Infantry in a wood ſhould be poſted ſo as to be covered by the trees, and at the ſame time able to fire upon the approaching enemy, or in the open parts behind abatis's.

In villages, when it is ſufficiently numerous, infantry takes poſt behind the hedges and walls of the outward gardens which look towards the country. When driven from thoſe, it retires from hedge to hedge always occupying the gardens, houſes and ſtreets, or roads which come within its line.

Battle of Norlingen, Auguſt 3, 1645.

General Mercy, who commanded the Bavarians in 1645, ſuppoſing that the French, commanded by the Duke of Enghien and the Marſhals Turenne and Grammont, after many advantages, which they had gained over him, would form the ſiege of

of Norlingen; to prevent that meaſure, paſſed the river Wernitz, and entrenched himſelf advantageouſly at the other ſide; having in his front the village of Allerheim, ſituated in a ſort of valley, in the middle of the plain of Norlingen, formed on the right by Wyneberg, from which there is a gentle deſcent to the village, and on the left by another mountain, on which ſtands the caſtle of Allerheim. He poſted all his cavalry, ſupported by ſome battalions, on the two hills, and his infantry in the valley in the centre; with the village, its church, ſteeple and church-yard occupied by infantry, and the whole front, from one mountain to the other, fortified and furniſhed with artillery. The Duke of Enghien attacked and eaſily carried the entrenchments of the village, but the Bavarians who had made loop-holes in the houſes kept up ſuch a fire as frequently to repulſe the French, until Turenne having routed the cavalry on the right, and taken the infantry in flank and rear, the army was obliged to retreat, and the brave detachment in the village to ſurrender themſelves priſoners at war.

Boſroger's Principes de la Guerre, page 347.

In the ſame manner, incloſed fields and meadows ſhould be occupied; eaſy communications ſhould be made through all the incloſures, ſo that not only each part can aſſiſt the other, but that the line may remain uninterrupted, and no opening be left for the enemy to penetrate. To a neglect of this principle, the Auſtrians, under the command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, owed in a great meaſure, if not entirely, the loſs of the battle of Prague

in the year 1757. " From a movement which
Lindſay's Military Miſcellany. " they made oppoſite to the King of Pruſſia, to
" their own right, to gain more ground and form
" an angle, in the fear of being attacked in flank
" and rear; they ſuffered ſeveral inconveniencies.
" Great haſte being made in unfavourable ground,
" their columns lengthened, which when they
" came to form, occaſioned ſeveral intervals, and
" a great ſpace between the angle and that part of
" the army behind Sterboli. The left ſide of the
" angle had not taken up a right alignment, which
" ſeems to have been the cauſe of this opening of
" above 400 paces." The king, whoſe eye nothing could eſcape, immediately ſaw and took advantage of this miſtake. General Manſtein was ordered to advance, with three battalions of grenadiers, two regiments of infantry and a body of cavalry, which ſervice he performed, in ſpight of the very great natural difficulties of the ground, which was extremely rugged, and the redoubts of the enemy. The gaining of this poſt was of the greateſt conſequence. Flanking batteries were immediately eſtabliſhed, and the Auſtrian line enfiladed, which could not fail of being deciſive.

This example alone is ſufficient to ſhew how neceſſary it is to march cloſe and well locked up.

Infantry is poſted behind rivers, moraſſes and ravines, to ſtop the progreſs of the enemy: for this purpoſe it is not neceſſary that there ſhould be an uninterrupted line, all along in rank and file; but that every part, where an enemy can paſs, ſhould be within the reach of ſmall arms, and defended

as

as much as poſſible by a croſſing fire. Infantry of the line has generally two field pieces attached to each battalion, together with the neceſſary ammunition waggons, beſides four bat horſes per company, to carry the tents, blankets and camp kettles.

In our ſervice the light infantry differs from that of the line, only in being compoſed of the youngeſt and moſt active men; but in the German armies they are markſmen armed with rifles, and trained to fight behind hedges, walls and in woods. As they are generally poſted in villages and ſituations where they can procure cover, they are not incumbered with tents; neither have they guns attached to their battalions.

The cavalry is likewiſe divided into heavy and light. The firſt formerly wore cuiraſſes; but as the defence which they afforded was found not ſufficient to counterpoiſe the inconvenience of carrying them, they have been generally laid aſide. The broad ſword or ſabre is the true weapon of the cavalriſt, although he is provided with a carabine for ſkirmiſhing occaſionally, and piſtols for his perſonal defence in caſe of misfortune, and to give him confidence. Of cavalry.

The heavy cavalry is, or ſhould be, uſed only to charge the enemy in cloſe order; this ſhould be done with the greateſt vivacity; but at the ſame time with compactneſs and regularity. The enemy being broken is cut to pieces with the ſword.

The cavalry is divided into ſquadrons of, from 120 to 180 men, in our ſervice at preſent 180.

The

The ſquadrons have ſmall intervals between them, and each has a ſtandard. Heavy cavalry is uſed chiefly in open ground, where it can be employed with advantage againſt all ſorts of troops, and even againſt batteries. The velocity of its movements, by which it can turn and cut off the enemy, take him in flank or rear, renders it extremely uſeful.

Dragoons were formerly a ſort of mounted infantry, who marched on horſeback, but generally fought on foot; but the inconvenience of that practice (by the neglect and conſequent deſtruction of the horſes by ſeparating the men from them) was found to be ſo great that they are never now, diſmounted, except in caſes of the moſt urgent neceſſity, and muſt be conſidered as cavalry.

As the horſe carries, not only the man, his arms, baggage, ammunition and proviſions, but alſo his own forage, the officers ſhould take care that nothing unneceſſary is packed upon him.

Light cavalry only differs from the heavy, in being compoſed of ſmaller men and horſes, and being more lightly equipped. Ours, combining ſtrength and activity, is the beſt in the world.

Uſe of light troops.

The particular ſervice of light troops, whether cavalry or infantry, is to keep as near the enemy as poſſible; watch all his motions, and diſcover his intentions; beat up his quarters frequently, and keep him in a ſtate of alert, in order to fatigue him; drive in his piquets and out-poſts; carry off his patroles; intercept his convoys, and deſtroy his magazines; ſlip between his poſts, and do him

him all the miſchief that is poſſible; purſue him when he is beaten, and complete his defeat, and retard his purſuit when he happens to be ſucceſsful; penetrate into his country and levy contributions. They are likewiſe to cover the movements of their own army; for this purpoſe they form a chain in front, and on its flanks; all the parts of which muſt be able to communicate with one another, and to fall back with facility upon the army. It is of conſequence that the different ſorts of troops ſhould be poſted in gound adapted to their mode of fighting; the cavalry on plains and in the open country; the iufantry in cloſe interſected places, behind hedges, walls, ravines, abatis's, redoubts, &c. and in woods: I have already given their duties in detail in another place. Their numbers have increaſed in all the European ſervices of late years: Frederick the Great ſaw their great utility, and added many regiments of huſſars, and battalions of light infantry to his army during the ſeven years war: he ſays in his Military Inſtructions, "that it "is almoſt impoſſible to ſurprize an Auſtrian army "from the crouds of Croats, Pandours and Huſ- "ſars with which it is ſurrounded." He found the want of well conſtituted light troops at Hochkirchen.

Military Inſtructions, page 69.

Towers's Frederick III. Vol. II. page 128.

"After various movements for protecting Ban- "denburgh from the incurſions of the Auſtrians, "and cutting off their communication with Bohe- "mia, Frederick took poſt in the neighbourhood of "Hochkirchen, with his left at Bantzen; from "whence

Surprize of the Pruſſians at Hochkirchen.

" whence he could command both Miſnia and Lu-
" ſatia, and keep up a communication with Prince
" Henry. In this poſition Marſhal Daun reſolved
Towers's Frederick III. " to attempt an attack by ſurpriſe upon the right
" of the Pruſſians, who had neglected to occupy
" the heights that commanded the village of
" Hochkirchen, which was only guarded by a few
" free companies.

He accordingly began his march late at night the 13th of October, 1758; having ordered a diverſion to be made on the left of the Pruſſians at the ſame time, to prevent it from affording aſſiſtance to the right; he occupied the hill above Hochkirchen, and erected batteries upon it, cut the free companies to pieces, and attacked the camp about four o'clock in the morning of the 14th. It is well known that the Pruſſians loſt on this occaſion, their camp equipage, a great part of their artillery, and 7000 men; among whom were Marſhal Keith and Prince Francis of Brunſwick killed, and many officers of rank taken priſoners.

Of the Artillery. The artillery is compoſed of bombardiers and gunners in our ſervice; in others, they have alſo ſappers, miners and pontoniers. The bombardiers and gunners are deſtined to the ſervice of the guns, and are armed with firelocks like the infantry, which are however of no uſe to them, except to give them confidence, and now and then for perſonal defence. Sappers and miners are only uſeful at ſieges. Piſtols and daggers are the only arms which the latter can have occaſion for under ground; the duty of the former ſeems to require none at all:

all: They however, carry arms for parade: they do not ſeem to be more neceſſary for the pontoniers, whoſe only buſineſs is to throw bridges of pontoons acroſs rivers.

To take the word in its fulleſt extent, the commander in chief is the firſt engineer; and under him the quarter-maſter general, who regulates and marks out the movements, encampments, and quarters of the army. Engineers properly ſpeaking, conduct, under the general, the operations of beſieging, fortifying, and defending towns. The field engineers are entruſted with the duty of taking up poſitions and preparing the camps and roads for the army, likewiſe conſtructing field works, and fortifying the camp; reconnoitring, and pointing out the attacks on the poſitions of the enemy. In ſhort the buſineſs of an engineer far exceeds the limits of this work, and the ability of the writer; but Muller's Works are open to every body, and all thoſe who are employed in the quarter-maſter general's department ſhould underſtand the field part of engineering. Beſides the above corps, the army is always provided with a corps of guides: though their officers are permanent, the men are changed frequently, and their duty is obvious: they are attached to the quarter-maſter general's department. Engineers.

In general, the ſtaff is poſted in a place of tolerable ſecurity, which is called head-quarters. It is compoſed of the commander in chief and his ſuite; the quartermaſter-general, the adjutant-general, the paymaſter-general, commiſſary-general, The ſtaff.

phyſician

phyſician and ſurgeon-generals, apothecary-general and waggon-maſter general, with all their deputies and aſſiſtants, and the provoſt marſhal.

The train. The train is divided into that of the artillery, which is again ſubdivided into field and ſiege trains under the commanding officer of artillery, and the pontoon train, which is under the command of a particular officer; the proviſion train, which, as well as every thing concerning proviſions and forage, is under the direction of the commiſſary-general; ſuch as the field bakery, ovens, &c. &c.

The baggage of the head-quarters includes that of all the ſutlers, and followers of it; and together with the baggage of the whole army, when aſſembled, is under the command of the waggon-maſter general, who has a corps of waggoners under his orders.

The provoſt Marſhall. It is the duty of the provoſt marſhal to preſerve order and regularity, by taking up all marauders, and other offenders, and to remove all nuiſances. All ſutlers are under his command when the army is encamped.

The hoſpital. The hoſpital is divided into the field hoſpital, which conſtantly attends the army, and one farther removed in the rear for difficult and tedious caſes; beſides which each regiment has its particular hoſpital.

Spies. Not only every general commanding an army, muſt employ ſpies; but alſo officers commanding out-poſts; but as the ſame man frequently gives information to both parties, the greateſt caution ſhould be uſed in truſting them, as they may be bribed

bribed by the enemy to deceive; which if diſcovered, they ſhould be immediately hung; they ſhould not be known to each other, and ſhould always be examined ſeparately. Voltaire's Age of Louis XIV.

William III. commanding the allies in Flanders in 1692, having taken a ſpy employed by the enemy, obliged him to write a letter of his dictating to the French general, which ſo completely deceived him, that William ſurpriſed his right wing at Steinkerk.

Spies being employed in all armies, the neceſſity of preventing any perſon from paſſing the out-poſt without a regular paſſport, is obvious.

The denominations of all the ſtaff officers, ſufficiently denote their duties to every regimental officer; it is therefore unneceſſary to detail them here.

Therefore having already mentioned the officers and departments, on which they roll, I ſhall proceed to treat of the great operations of the army, or at leaſt the principles on which they are conducted.

Troops are encamped, in order that they may be more readily able to act collectively againſt the enemy. The camp takes its name from the head-quarters. Of Encampments.

In order that the camp ſhould afford no advantage to the enemy, the following rules ſhould be obſerved. Rules for Encamping.

1ſt, The ground muſt be neither too extenſive, nor confined. 2d, The enemy muſt not be able to attack it in flank nor rear. 3d, Neither muſt it be liable to be attacked in front unexpectedly, and before proper meaſures can be taken for its defence.

fence. 4th, The approach, in front, muſt be difficult, and ſo ſituated as to be eaſily defended by muſquetry. 5th, The communication through the camp muſt be ſuch, that all the parts of the army can mutually ſupport one another. 6th, The egreſs from the camp, muſt be eaſy to the army on every ſide.

Firſt rule. Whatever ſpace a battalion or ſquadron occupies under arms, it requires for the front of its encampment the ſame ground. Therefore the ſame ground that the army occupies under arms, allowing the proper intervals between ſquadrons and battalions, will be neceſſary for its encampment; but if the extent to be occupied is too great, then the intervals muſt be enlarged; but never more than a ſpace equal to the front of the battalions and ſquadrons; which is called the half full line. An army ſeldom encamps in one line; but generally has two, and a reſerve behind the ſecond. When any ſquadron or battalion is detached from the line, the ground is taken up by another. It is very eaſy from the number of ſquadrons and battalions, in the firſt line, to know the ſpace neceſſary for the camp. With reſpect to the depth, each line requires 300 paces, which is the diſtance between them in battle, in order that the ſecond may be out of the reach of fire.

Second rule. The ſecond is, that the flanks ſhould be covered; which they are if the enemy cannot march directly againſt them, without firſt forcing the poſts which cover them, or making ſuch a detour as to give ſufficient time to take proper meaſures to

to fruſtrate his attempt. Therefore let us ſee by what the flanks can be ſecured. 1ſt, by the ſea; but then we muſt examine how deep the water is; ſtrengthen it by ſtockades, and every other method as far as it can be waded through; inform ourſelves of the poſſible changes in the ebbing and flowing of the tide, and be ſure that the enemy's ſhips cannot annoy our camp. 2d, Rivers; theſe are excellent ſupports for the flanks, when there are but few paſſes over them, and they eaſily defended. 3d, Lakes; their excellence depends upon their ſize and depth, and the diſtance which the enemy is obliged to march, in order to get round them. 4th, Moraſſes; provided we know to a certainty, that they are impaſſable. 5th, Mountains or ravines; when they are very ſteep; but if they can be climbed, they ſhould be fortified. Ravines are good cover for a flank, when the hills which form them are higher on our ſide than that of the enemy; but they ſhould be fortified, and commanded in ſuch a manner that the enemy cannot paſs them. 6th, Woods; but they are not a good ſupport to a flank; for even though we abatiſe them, the enemy can eſtabliſh himſelf in them.

The King of Pruſſia objects to encamping near woods, as they encourage deſertion; but that crime is ſo little known in our army, that no objection ſhould be made on that account; villages, when well ſituated are an excellent cover to the flanks; but they muſt be ſo fortified and defended that the enemy cannot think of attacking Military Inſtructions.

them with any proſpect of ſucceſs; as on them depends the ſafety of the whole army.

Third rule. The third rule ſays, that, neither muſt it be liable to be attacked in front unexpectedly, and before proper meaſures can be taken for its defence: therefore there ſhould be no villages, woods, hedges, ditches, or any thing elſe which can cover the approach of an enemy, within the range of cannon, in front of the camp; neither muſt any ravines nor hollow ways, through which he might march concealed, be in front of the army; neither any heights; but in caſe of attack the enemy muſt be under the fire of our whole front; and all his movements muſt be ſo expoſed to our view, that we can take our meaſures to counteract his intentions: towards this, it is neceſſary that all ſuch things which happen to be in front, ſhould either be deſtroyed, or fortified and occupied by troops, ſo as either to repel his attack, or at leaſt give time to the army to retreat, and be out of all danger.

Fourth rule. The fourth rule has a great analogy to the former; in as much as whatever protects the flanks, affords a proportionably greater protection to the front; as the flanks ſhould be perfectly ſecured againſt any attempt, whereas it is ſufficient that the front is rendered difficult of acceſs. An army never fronts to the ſea, except to prevent a diſembarkation; in which caſe, care ſhould be taken that a heavy and collected fire may be kept on the landing places: the ſame rule applies to lakes, inundations, and moraſſes, which render the front almoſt inattackable.

inattackable. A river is a great impediment to the enemy, if there are but few fords, and that he is obliged to throw over bridges under our fire. A perfect moraſs renders the front inattackable; but even when it is only difficult to paſs, it affords a great defence. Woods are a diſadvantage, in front, as they afford cover to the enemy.—— Ravines and hollow ways running along the front, afford a good defence; but if they interſect it, their courſe ſhould be commanded by our fire. When villages are tenable, they afford a good protection; but otherwiſe they ſhould be deſtroyed; the ſame rule applies to all ſingle houſes and buildings.

The fifth rule requires, that no river, moraſs, ravine, or unpaſſable wood, ſhould interſect the army, much leſs ſeparate the two lines. Whenever it ſo happens, bridges, and roads of communication ſhould be made. Fifth Rule.

The ſixth rule requires, that the egreſs from the camp ſhould be eaſy on every ſide to the army; and that, of courſe, roads ſhould be prepared for that purpoſe, as ſoon as the camp is marked out. However, it is not eaſy to find a ſtrong camp from which an army can move forward with facility, in the preſence of an enemy. But if we mean to advance, we ſhall not look for a ſtrong front to our camp. On the other hand, if we mean to remain on the defenſive, it will be ſufficient to find the roads open to the flanks and rear. Sixth Rule.

It is evident, according to the third rule, and the nature of our arms, that if there are high grounds

within our reach, we ſhould prefer them to the hollows for our camp. We know that ſhot fired from low ground, has but little effect againſt any thing above it; and that the fire of depreſſed guns, from a very high ſituation, is equally ineffectual. Artillery does moſt execution, placed on a gentle aſcent, where a grazing or ſkimming fire can be obtained. Beyond the diſtances of two hundred toiſes, fire is very uncertain; within that ſpace it will have ſome effect: but, at 100, it becomes formidable. The range of battalion guns cannot be eſteemed at more than one hundred and fifty toiſes, and that only for round ſhot; grape and cartridge ſhot do not tell farther than muſketry.

Out-Poſts. I have already ſaid, in another place, that, for the ſecurity of the camp, out-poſts muſt be detached: they muſt be poſted ſo far from the army, and in ſuch a manner, that it can always be formed, and ready to defend itſelf before the enemy can arrive. Thoſe out-poſts muſt form a chain, through which nothing can paſs unnoticed, and be able to ſupport each other: they are compoſed of light troops, and troops of the line. Upon plains, they conſiſt of cavalry; and infantry, in cloſe interſected ground. A poſt of light cavalry is (among the Germans, whoſe huſſars and dragoons are mounted on very ſmall horſes) generally ſupported by one of heavy: but with us, the light dragoons will anſwer for both; this is again ſupported by one of infantry. In woods, and behind hedges, light infantry are generally poſted; and troops of the line in houſes, villages, and behind works. Each poſt

poſt advances one or more piquets in his front. The ſmall poſts of cavalry are not expected to maintain their ground, but to retreat from a ſuperior force: but the infantry ſhould make every poſſible reſiſtance, in order that the army may have ſufficient time to prepare for action. As ſoon as any one poſt perceives the enemy advancing, it ſhould give notice to the others: but I have already detailed the duties of out-poſts. In open countries, where the enemy meets no natural impediment, they ſhould be conſiderably advanced; but in a ſtrong cloſe country, they may be poſted nearer to the army.

Convenience of the Troops.

As the neceſſities of the troops require wood and water, it is indiſpenſable that attention ſhould be paid to thoſe articles, therefore care muſt be taken that they are not ſpoiled or deſtroyed; likewiſe, the forage which may be in the neighbourhood of the camp.

Marking out the Ground.

The quarter-maſters of regiments ſet out from head-quarters, under the command of the quarter-maſter-general. After he has marked out the ground, with the intervals to be obſerved between battalions and ſquadrons, his aſſiſtants diſtribute it among the brigades or regiments, according to their ſtrength; and the regimental quarter-maſters diſtribute it among the troops and companies.

Thoſe are the rules for encamping, deduced from the precepts and practice of the greateſt Generals, from which nobody can depart, with impunity, before an enterprizing and experienced enemy.—Great genius will, and may deviate from rules, becauſe it ſurpaſſes them; but the greateſt men have been

Towers's Hiſtory of Frederick III Vol. II. page 128.

been known to ſuffer by it, and repent. We have already ſeen how the King of Pruſſia was ſurprized by Marſhal Daun, at Hochkirchen, by omitting to occupy the hill above the village, and not ſufficiently guarding the latter. Colonel Templehoffe, in his Remarks on General Loyd's Hiſtory of the Seven Years War, attributes the victory of the Auſtrians over the Pruſſians, at Breſlaw, to the great extent of the Pruſſian entrenchments. The camp which the French occupied at Minden was much too confined for ſuch a great army, acting on the offenſive: there was no way of advancing from it, but by a narrow road between the town and a moraſs, and afterwards forming on the plain of Minden. The King of Pruſſia ſays, in his Poſthumous Works, that a camp, like a garment, ſhould be fitted to the body which is to occupy it. In 1706, Prince Eugene attacked, and defeated the French army, beſieging Turin, under the command of the Duke de la Feullade: their poſition being interſected by the Doire, and the neceſſary communication interrupted. In 1712, Prince Eugene was beat at Denin, by Marſhal Villars, his poſition being too extenſive: Lord Albermarle was poſted at Denin, which was at too great a diſtance from the Prince for mutual ſupport. This Villars perceived; and while a body of dragoons kept Eugene in check, fell upon and defeated Albermarle.

Dundas's Sketch of the Campaigns of Duke Ferdinand.

Voltaire's Hiſtory.

Thoſe are ſome of the faults of thoſe great men. —Thoſe who would profit by their example muſt ſtudy their hiſtory.

Of Marches.

Every officer is, or ought to be, in poſſeſſion of Lieutenant

Lieutenant-General Dundas's Syſtem of Military Tactics; and, is conſequently acquainted with the manner of marching his regiment.—I ſhall, therefore, laying aſide that part which we ſee practiſed every day, proceed at once to the march of an army.

Were an army, with artillery and baggage, to march in one column, it would require too much time to get in motion, or to form in order of battle: it, therefore, generally forms more; but their numbers depend on the ground, and the object of the general. The following rules are then to be obſerved:—

Firſt, In advancing againſt the enemy, or retreating from him, as many columns ſhould be formed as the ground will admit: as the more there are of them, of courſe, the ſhorter they will be, and the ſooner formed in order of battle.

The ground admits of as many columns as there are roads to be found or made, but care muſt be taken that they are all good; otherwiſe, fewer columns will be better, as what delays one, retards the whole army.

Second, If we can form but few columns, our precautions ſhould be encreaſed, ſo that either we may not be attacked, or that we may have time enough to be formed in good order before the enemy can arrive. If we expect the enemy on the flank, and that he can attack us ſuddenly, we generally march by *lines*, ſo that each line can form at once on its own ground; but if it is probable that he cannot attack us ſo ſuddenly, it is more convenient to

See the Orders of Duke Ferdinand in General David

Dundas's Sketch of the Campaigns of 1757, 8, 9, 60, 61, and 62.

march in more columns. When the march is to be through a woody and mountainous country, the cavalry ſhould not form the outward columns, but be covered by the infantry: the artillery and baggage are always on the moſt protected roads.—In advancing and retreating, the columns generally conſiſt of a part of both lines.

Security of the March.

For the ſecurity of the march, the following meaſures are taken:—There is a ſtrong advance guard, if the movement is forward: its compoſition regulated by the nature of the country: it ſends out parties of light troops on every ſide, as far as poſſible, to give timely intelligence of the approach of the enemy. The advance guard not only ſupports thoſe detachments, but covers the army in its march againſt any corps which may be advanced againſt it, drives back any of the enemy who approach it, and reſiſts him, ſhould he attack with his army, until we are formed and ready to receive him.

In retreating, the rear guard performs the ſame duties, and takes every advantage of ſituation which the country affords, to retard the progreſs of the enemy. Both ſhould, by their manœuvres and their detachments, cover all the columns of the army againſt an attack. When the enemy is expected on the flank, troops are detached on that ſide, who likewiſe ſend parties to reconnoitre. The baggage always marches, covered by the army; advancing, it is in the rear; retreating, in the front; and on a flank march, on that ſide where there is no danger to apprehend. When there is no danger,

it

it often immediately precedes, or follows the brigades or regiments; otherwiſe, it precedes, or follows the army at a conſiderable diſtance. When the army marches with an intention of fighting, the artillery is brigaded in the columns, and forms with them; otherwiſe, the park has generally its own column. The columns ſhould never croſs upon each other on the march; never cloſe or ſeparate too much; never get too forward, nor fall back. The firſt of theſe depends upon the quarter-maſter-general's aſſiſtants, or field-engineers, who mark the routes; the laſt, on the officers who lead the columns. When any column is delayed by a defile, the others ſhould wait for it. But if the whole army ſhould be obliged to paſs one, care muſt be taken that nothing is to be apprehended from the enemy during the operation.

Convenience of the Troops.

The convenience of the army requires good roads; the beſt for the artillery: for the cavalry, marſhes and woods ſhould be avoided; alſo ſteep hills, ravines, &c. even by a *detour*. For the infantry, attention ſhould be paid to the diſtance, that the men ſhould not be too much fatigued.—As all the columns ſhould march and arrive on their ground nearly at the ſame time, there ſhould be no ſenſible difference in the length of the routes.—The routes are marked by the quarter-maſter-general's aſſiſtants, with ſticks ſtuck in the ground, and wiſps of ſtraw tied to them. Where two columns are obliged to touch, one of the routes is diſtinguiſhed by two ſticks croſſed, or ſome other mark.

See Duke Ferdinand's Orders in General Dundas's Sketch.

Detach-

Detachments.

Detachments are made for the following purpoſes:

Firſt, To occupy a poſt.

Second, To fall upon ſome poſt or detachment of the enemy.

Third, To reconnoitre.

I have already detailed their duties; the greateſt principle of which is to keep the object for which we are detached in view, and not to deviate from it.

In 1600, Maurice, Prince of Orange, having diſembarked his army between Oſtend and Newport, detached Count Erneſt, of Naſſau, to Inſengenbridge, to occupy that poſt. The Count, on his arrival, found that the Spaniards had already paſſed it, and attacked them with his detachment of 2000 men, inſtead of falling back upon the army; from which he was immediately cut off, and glad to make good his retreat into Oſtend, by which Maurice was deprived of his aſſiſtance in the engagement which immediately followed, when the Spaniards were defeated.

Local knowledge.

A general acquires his general knowledge of the country by the maps, and a more detailed one by the plans, which are drawn by the officers under the direction of the quarter-maſter-general, and other intelligent officers who are ſent to reconnoitre, and inform themſelves of the reſources of the country with reſpect to forage and proviſions: they bring back with them ſuch people as can give the beſt information.

Proportions of an Army.

The ſtrength of the army ſhould be proportioned to its object, and the force which is to be oppoſed to it. In an open country, a great eſtabliſhment

of

of cavalry is neceſſary. In a mountainous, woody or interſected country, or where there are many fortified places, a numerous infantry; and in the latter caſe, a great train of heavy artillery.—Where a war of poſts may be expected, a large field train: where many rivers are, a great pontoon train; and where but few or no navigable rivers are, a numerous proviſion train.

Magazines of proviſions and forage are formed for the ſupport of the army, as well as military ſtores. They are frequently eſtabliſhed in different places, in order to deceive the enemy in the intended point of attack. The ſubſiſtence of the army being a matter of the greateſt importance, not only the greateſt attention is to be paid to the circumſtances of the country in which it is to act, but alſo to the ſeaſon of the year. If you mean to enter the enemy's country in winter or ſpring, it will be impoſſible to advance more than three or four days march from your magazines, with a large body of cavalry, unleſs you are pretty certain of being able to ſeize upon ſome of thoſe of the enemy. There is generally a bread waggon for each troop and company in the army. They commonly carry ſix days' bread; the ſoldiers three: by means of theſe the army marches with nine days' bread: the proviſion train may carry nine days' flour: ſo that the army will move with eighteen days' bread or flour. The army can then only advance ſix days' march from its magazines to be ſtationary, until they can be moved forward, or others formed by deliveries from the country. The field Proviſions.

field bakery commonly bakes every ſecond or third day.

Colonel Templehoffe's Calculations, tranſlated by the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Lindſay, on "The Subſiſtence of an Army in the Field," are admirable, and ſhould be in the hands of every military man who aſpires to the honour of a command: it would be ſuperfluous to detail them here.

In 1635, Prince Frederick Henry of Naſſau, commanding the Dutch troops, penetrated into the Spaniſh Netherlands to the very gates of Bruſſels; but depending on the country for ſupplies, his proviſions were cut off by the maſterly conduct of the Cardinal Infant, commanding the Spaniards; and he was obliged to retreat into Holland, abandoning all his conqueſts, without a blow. We have many inſtances of the ſame kind, but one is ſufficient here.

Offenſive War. When we mean to act offenſively, at the commencement of a war, we muſt endeavour to anticipate the enemy—as Great Britain always did in the adminiſtration of the great Chatham. The neceſſary calculations of force, proviſions, &c. muſt be made, as well as the time which the enterprize will require; and in caſe of its miſcarriage, another fixed upon as a ſubſtitute.

Among the advantages to be thus gained are,—1ſt, To ſeize upon one of his principal towns or provinces, as the King of Pruſſia did upon Sileſia in 1740.—2d, To cauſe his army to be ſo diſperſed, that it cannot be ſoon re-aſſembled.—3d, To fall upon one of his allies, and force him to a peace, as

Frederick

Frederick did the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, in 1745.—4th, To gain ſome poſt or town which opens a paſſage into the enemy's country, or the command of a river which runs through it.

To thoſe are to be oppoſed,—1ſt, Strong places.—2d, Rivers.—3d, Defiles formed by mountains, woods, and moraſſes, beſides the hoſtile army.

In the firſt place, the campaign will begin with a ſiege, which ſhould be,—1ſt, Of a place that is the key to our own country, or that of our allies, or that of the enemy.—2d, One that commands a river which can ſerve for the tranſport of our ſtores or his.—3d, That commands our communications, or thoſe of the enemy.—4th, Where the enemy has a magazine.

All fortified places which are not likely to be uſeful, either while the army is advancing, or in caſe of a retreat, ſhould be deſtroyed as ſoon as taken. In paſſing rivers and defiles, attention muſt be paid to thoſe places where poſts can be eſtabliſhed, anſwering either to cover the advance or retreat.

In an open country, we muſt endeavour to get poſſeſſion of ſome tenable place, to eſtabliſh a magazine, and which may ſerve to cover our retreat.

But above all things, we muſt never undertake any thing without being certain that we have ſufficient time and means.

Alexander, and Charles the XIIth of Sweden, were equally ambitious, brave, and enterprizing. Alexander conquered a world by the prudence of his

his meaſures.—Charles ruined a kingdom, and would have loſt it, had he lived, by the wildneſs of his ſchemes.

Taking the field a few days before the enemy, is ſometimes productive of great advantages, which ſhould be calculated, and the probable expence of men, horſes, &c. balanced againſt them; particularly, the lives of the ſoldiers ſhould not be thrown away. When Bonaparte ſacrificed 3000 grenadiers to force the bridge of Lodi, which he could have turned by a march of a few leagues—he acted more like a Bacchanal than a General;—at St. Jean d'Acre, his deſperate ſituation could only excuſe his eleven fruitleſs aſſaults.

But when the enemy has already taken the field, and is poſted ſo as effectually to oppoſe our entrance into his country, which we are, nevertheleſs, determined to attempt; or to prevent us from beſieging one of his towns, we ſhall endeavour to effect it by a diverſion: as the Imperialiſts and French, under the Prince of Saxe-Hilbpurghauſen, and the Marſhal Soubiſe, in 1757, obliged the King of Pruſſia, by their irruption into Saxony, to quit his camp at Bernſtaedt, and thus enabled Prince Charles to puſh forward Count Haddick with 8000 Auſtrians to Berlin.

In order that this diverſion ſhould have the propoſed effect, it ſhould put the enemy in great danger and conſequent alarm: or,

Second, By interrupting his ſupplies, which is done by ſeizing the poſts or rivers, by which he draws them; or by frequently attacking his convoys,

voys, for which a large corps of light troops will be requiſite.

Third, By detaching.—This is a ſort of diverſion in the neighbourhood of his army; one or more corps are detached upon his flank or rear, who ſeize upon any poſts which he has left unoccupied, intercept his convoys, &c. and do him all ſorts of miſchief.

Fourth, By marching and counter-marching, we ſhall endeavour to draw him from his poſt, or induce him to weaken it, and ſeize that opportunity of paſſing or forcing it.

In the year 1757, the King of Pruſſia, previous to the battle of Prague, made ſuch movements as to induce Prince Charles of Lorraine to detach 20,000 men from his ſtrong entrenched camp on the banks of the Moldau; which corps, Frederick, by a maſterly manœuvre, cut off from all communication with the Prince, and then attacked him.

The laſt and ſimpleſt mode of penetrating into the enemy's country is, by a battle: but as it is likewiſe the moſt hazardous, a good general will prefer any other, when he has it in his power, unleſs the advantages reſulting from a victory promiſe to be ſuch as to counterpoiſe the riſk.—In ſhort, unleſs much may be gained, and little can be loſt.

By the battle of Hohen Friedberg, the King of Pruſſia drove the Auſtrians out of Sileſia, and was enabled to enter Bohemia; by that of Czaſlau, he gained a peace and a province.

The

Defenſive War. The general who acts on the defenſive, labours under great difficulties: his motions are regulated by thoſe of his enemy.—It is therefore his buſineſs to take the earlieſt opportunity of changing the face of affairs, and rendering his operations offenſive: he muſt, therefore, be always ready for ſuch an event.

If the country is defended by fortified towns, the army ſhould be ſo poſted as to be able to ſuccour thoſe which may be threatened: if by rivers, or other defiles, the paſſes muſt be occupied and fortified with field works; if it has neither fortified places, nor defiles for its defence, the army ſhould be ſo poſted as to be able to watch the motions of the enemy, in order to counteract his intentions.

Such was Marſhal Daun's conduct in Moravia, in the year 1758, when he commanded the Auſtrians, and obliged the King of Pruſſia to raiſe the ſiege of Olmutz, by frequently throwing ſuccours into the place, and intercepting the convoys of the Pruſſian army; ſuch was the conduct of that general in 1757, when taking poſt at Kolin, he was ſo troubleſome to Frederick, then beſieging Prague, that he provoked the King to attack him in his ſtrong intrenched camp, gained a complete victory over him, and obliged him to raiſe the ſiege.

Aſſembling the Army. When the army is aſſembled to act offenſively, a principal object is, not to point out, by its poſition, the intended point of attack: it ſhould then be divided into ſeveral corps; but all ſo ſituated as to be able to join together with expedition and facility, roads ſhould be opened and repaired on every

ſide,

ſide, and all the neceſſary cattle and carriages kept in readineſs. The King of Pruſſia was a maſter in this art. His great opponent, Marſhal Daun, is ſaid to have declared of him, that he aſſembled his troops in ſuch a manner, that it was impoſſible to penetrate his deſigns.

In defenſive war, I have already ſaid, the movements of the army muſt be regulated by thoſe of the enemy; and of courſe, the camps and quarters, in which it is to aſſemble, muſt depend upon his ſuppoſed intentions. In aſſembling the army, fatiguing marches ſhould be avoided, until the men and horſes become gradually accuſtomed to the field.

If the country is defended by defiles, they are occupied by troops, while the main body of the army either takes a central poſition to ſupport them, or follows the enemy in all his movements. In defenſive war, as the army is probably inferior to the enemy, detachments ſhould be made with great caution. I have already ſhewn the advantage which the King of Pruſſia reaped from the circumſtance of Prince Charles having detached twenty thouſand men, previous to the battle of Prague. It is better to leave a part of our country open to the depredations of the enemy, than to fritter away our army by attempting to occupy every poſt.—Hiſtory affords many proofs of the truth of this maxim.

No detachment ſhould be made to ſuch a diſtance as not to be ſupported, unleſs it is equal, either by its own force, or that of its ſituation, to cope with any thing which can be brought againſt it, or at leaſt to enſure a ſafe retreat.

The King of Pruſſia ſays, in his Military Inſtructions, that "He ſhould have been beaten at "Sohr; and he deſerved it, for having made ſuch "large detachments, if the abilities of his generals, "and the bravery of his troops had not ſaved him." —— Such authority is worth a thouſand examples.

Frederick himſelf has been blamed for having, in 1759, detached General Finck to Maxen, to intercept the communication of Marſhal Daun, encamped on the plain between Dreſden and Plawen, with Bohemia; but the Captains, now Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, C. and R. Crawford, in their notes upon "Tielke's Account of ſome of the moſt remarkable Events of the War between the Pruſſians, &c." acquit the King totally; and attribute the capture of that General to his not having properly occupied the ground with which they were perfectly acquainted.

Of retreating. When we would retreat, in order to avoid a battle, if the enemy is near, as we muſt take every precaution to prevent him from perceiving our deſign, we muſt avoid any noiſe or unuſual movements: ſuch as burning magazines, ſtriking tents, withdrawing poſts, &c. likewiſe endeavour to deceive the enemy by a good countenance, by ſtrengthening our poſition, giving out falſe reports, &c. and, finally, by marching by night. —We muſt alſo ſecure our retreat, by occupying ſuch defiles or other poſts, as the enemy will be obliged to paſs in following us, or poſt cavalry to attack him in flank. If he is at ſuch a diſtance

as

as to be able only to harraſs us by his light troops, a detachment may be advanced to act offenſively againſt them, and drive them back upon their own army.

The ſick, baggage, and heavy artillery, ſhould be ſent in front at ſuch a diſtance as not to impede the march of the army.

In the year 1591, the famous Alexander Farneſe, Prince of Parma, commanding the Spaniards upon the Wahl, and having that river in his rear, Maurice of Naſſau, Prince of Orange, being oppoſed to him with a ſuperior force: the latter imagined that it was impoſſible for his enemy to eſcape, until he ſaw him file over a bridge of boats, thrown acroſs the river under the protection of lines conſtructed for that purpoſe. When the King of Pruſſia was obliged by Marſhal Daun to raiſe the ſiege of Olmutz, he took his meaſures ſo well as to gain a full day's march on the Auſtrians, and advanced into Bohemia.

Forward and Parallel Marching.

We advance, or march in a parallel line with the enemy, either for the purpoſe of acting offenſively or defenſively. If we would act offenſively, we muſt take care not to expoſe our own communication with our magazines to be interrupted, unleſs we are ſure of finding every thing in the country into which we march, neither our retreat into our own country to be cut off. When we know that thoſe are ſecure, we march either in one body or in diviſions, according to the object in view: if to give battle, or to inveſt a town, it will probably be in diviſions or columns, which will all arrive at

their points of attack at the ſame time, or at the place of general rendezvous; in which caſe, the movements of all the diviſions are combined. If we hope to ſucceed in our enterprize, we muſt be ſecret; but at the ſame time, not neglect (in order to conceal our intentions) to ſend forward detachments to ſeize upon any poſts which may be advantageous to us, or to the enemy, if firſt occupied by him. Thoſe detachments muſt be of ſufficient force to maintain themſelves until the arrival of the army. If we march parallel with the enemy, we ſhould endeavour to ſecure all the paſſes between the country occupied by him and our own army, whether we mean to penetrate or to prevent him from doing ſo.

In the year 1653, we have ſeen Marſhal Turenne, with only 12,000 men, fruſtrate all the attempts of the great Condé with 30,000: he, firſt, by poſting himſelf judiciouſly between the two corps of the Prince's army, one having taken up its winter quarters on the Samber, the other in the county of Luxembourg, obliged him to make ſo great a *detour*, that he was enabled to take Rhetel before they could form their junction: and when the Prince threatened Picardy, the towns of which were without troops to garriſon them, Turenne, inſtead of dividing his little army amongſt them, which would have ſubjected it to be taken priſoner in detail, ſtuck ſo cloſe to him, and poſted himſelf ſo well, as effectually to prevent the Prince from undertaking any enterprize. His laſt campaign upon the Rhine in 1675, when oppoſed to Montecuculi, one of the greateſt generals which the Auſtrian ſervice has produced,

produced, is worthy the attention of military men: he not only prevented his opponent from entering Alſace, but (himſelf) paſſed the Rhine with an inferior force, took ſuch poſitions as never to be attacked, and ultimately forced the Imperialiſts to retreat.

In all combined marches, that is, when the army moves in ſeveral diviſions or columns, which cannot immediately join together, it is neceſſary that, for the ſafety of the ſeveral diviſions, the enemy ſhould know nothing of our march, or that all the paſſes leading towards him, ſhould be occupied by us in ſuch a manner, that we ſhall have immediate intelligence of any movement which he may make againſt any of our columns; that each diviſion ſhould have a ſecure retreat in caſe of misfortune, or can find ſituations on its march, in which it can maintain itſelf till reinforced by ſome of the others, or that, the enemy cannot attack one corps on its march, without being attacked in flank by ſome of the other diviſions. The operations of armies acting at a great diſtance from each other are often combined. We ſee the King of Pruſſia, in 1757, marching four armies into Bohemia by as many different routes; and we ſee, in the ſame war, the operations of the Britiſh and Pruſſian armies combined acroſs the whole of Germany.

March by ſucceſſive Diviſions.

An army often marches by ſucceſſive diviſions.— For inſtance, when ſome great defiles impede or prevent the march of the whole; or when a diviſion is ſent forward to ſeize upon ſome poſition or ma-

gazine: in either of which caſes, the advanced diviſion ſhould be ſufficiently ſtrong to ſuſtain itſelf till the army arrives, or at leaſt to ſecure a ſafe retreat; but in the latter caſe, it ſhould not weaken the army ſo much as to prevent any other expedition, which might be undertaken in caſe of the failure of the firſt intended.

Campagne du Roi de Pruſſe de 1778 a 1779, page 59.

In the ſummer of 1778, Prince Henry of Pruſſia being encamped at Plauen, near Dreſden, and determining to march into Bohemia, detached Lieutenant-General Moellendorf to precede him with a corps, who, by forced marches, ſeized upon the important paſſes of Marienberg and Baſsberg, in which Marſhal Laudon might have anticipated him. At the ſame time, General Platen was ordered with another corps to take poſſeſſion of the defiles of Dippolſwald and Riechen Staedt, while the Prince encamped with the army at Freyberg, on the ſame route that Moellendorf had marched, who puſhed his advanced poſts as far as Commotan, and deſtroyed the abatis's formed in that neighbourhood by the Auſtrians.

In defenſive war, an army marches by ſucceſſive diviſions to reinforce a garriſon, or occupy a defile through which the enemy might paſs before the whole army is ready to march.

Feints or Diverſions.

Feints or diverſions are made either by a detached corps, or by the whole army: if by a detached corps, the rule which equally applies to all detachments, great or ſmall, ſhould not be forgot, viz. that it muſt be able either to ſupport itſelf, or to make good its retreat on the army. In either caſe, the

the light troops are conſiderably advanced; but we muſt not draw the main body too far from the real object. It is unneceſſary to add, how eſſential it is that the feint ſhould have the appearance of reality.

In July, 1760, the King of Pruſſia having taken the neceſſary meaſures for marching into Sileſia, quitted his camp on the frontiers of Saxony, and proceeded through Luſatia towards Sileſia: this induced Count Daun to do the ſame, who marched with ſuch rapidity, in order to protect Sileſia, that he got two marches a-head of the King, who then wheeled into the contrary direction, and ſuddenly appeared before Dreſden.

In the ſame year, General Laudon, commanding an Auſtrian corps, after making ſeveral feints on Glatz, Schweidnitz, and Breſlau, took poſſeſſion of Landſhut, and left a ſmall corps in it, as if for its protection, which induced the Pruſſian General Fouguet to march from the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, in order to diſpoſſeſs this corps, which he eaſily effected; but the Auſtrian was, in the mean time, enabled to ſeize ſuch paſſes as (nearly) to ſurround him, and completely to defeat him, and take him priſoner.

In the year 1778, Prince Henry of Pruſſia having advanced Moellendorf upon Commotan, as above-mentioned, and ordered Platen to take poſt between Groſſedlitz and Maxen, as if he intended to march upon Peterſwald: thus threatening both Prague and Egra, ſuddenly wheeled to the left, recalled Moellendorf, paſſed the Elbe near Gamig, and encamped between Stolpen and Radewalde, and

Campagne du Roi de Pruſſe de 1778 a 1779, page 62, 63.

from thence marched in four columns through the (ſuppoſed to an army) impenetrable defiles of the mountains of Bohemia, the heavy artillery and baggage taking the route of Zittau, leaving the mountains on the right.

Defiles. The paſſage of a defile, near an enemy, is a dangerous and difficult operation: whether he knows our intention, and is prepared to oppoſe us, or is ignorant where we mean to attempt it, and watches our motions; and whether he is at the ſame or the oppoſite ſide. A defile cannot be conſidered as paſſed until the whole army, or at leaſt a ſufficient force to ſecure the paſſage of the remainder, has got through.

In 1745, the King of Pruſſia (at the battle of Hohen Friedberg) attacked Prince Charles of Lorraine, paſſing out of the defiles of the mountains which ſeparate Sileſia from Bohemia. Previous to this battle, the King had withdrawn his troops from all the paſſes which they occupied in thoſe defiles, and cauſed the roads to be repaired, as if he meant to march to Breſlaw, by which he effectually deceived Prince Charles, and drew him into the ſnare which he had laid for him.

We have already given ſome account of Prince Henry's paſſage of the mountains between Saxony and Bohemia, and his manœuvres to deceive Marſhal Laudon.

For the paſſage of defiles in general, the roads are already made; but for rivers, there is this difference, for the moſt part, that a bridge muſt be firſt thrown over. It is generally formed of pontoons

toons, or boats; therefore ſome men are firſt ſent acroſs partly to defend, and partly to conſtruct it. When we can command the other ſide of the river by the fire of our artillery and ſmall arms, from our own ſide, it may be paſſed by open force; but for this there are neceſſary—1ſt. A convenient ſituation for conſtructing more than one bridge, where artillery and infantry can make a croſſing fire in front of the places where the bridges are to be thrown over.—2d. That the bank on our ſide ſhould be higher than that on the other, and that the courſe of the river ſhould form a bow, with its arch towards us, and that it ſhould not be too wide.—3d, That the ground ſhould be ſuch at the other ſide, as to admit of the immediate formation of the troops on their arrival.

When ſuch a ſituation is found, and fixed upon, the infantry and artillery are poſted where thoſe arms can act with moſt effect, and as much as poſſible covered by field works. A detachment is ſent over partly to conſtruct the bridge, and partly to throw up works for its protection; which may be more or leſs ſtrong according to the effect our fire can take from our own ſide. This detachment paſſes over by fords, boats or rafts; the cavalry by the firſt; the infantry by the laſt. The cavalry might alſo take infantry behind it, and either remain, if there is nothing to apprehend from the fire of the enemy) ready to fall upon any party which might attack the infantry conſtructing the bridge, or the work in front of it, or return to our own ſide. When the bridge is finiſhed

ed and the work man'd with infantry, the ground at the other ſide determines which arm is to lead.

No prudent general will make ſuch an attempt, except he is morally certain of ſucceſs, as ſhould he be beaten after having paſſed with the whole or part of the army, the conſequence is obvious.

Boſroger, page 326. The paſſage of the Leck (by Guſtavus Adolphus) in the year 1632, is one of the moſt remarkable we know of in modern times to have been made by open force; it is one of the many proofs of the advantage which may be derived from the confidence of troops uſed to victory. Count Tilly, commanding the Bavarian troops, was in immediate expectation of being reinforced by General Walleſtein with a large body of imperialiſts; the King of Sweden knew this, and reſolved to attack him before the junction, although advantageouſly poſted behind the Leck, having the Danube on his right, and the town of Rain on his left. Guſtavus found a proper ſituation on the river, (forming an inverted bow) and erected three batteries of heavy cannon, one on the centre of the bow, and one on each ſide; the bank on his ſide being higher than that on the other, gave him every advantage: he threw over a bridge under the protection of his batteries, (concealing it by the ſmoke of wet ſtraw, ſet on fire for the purpoſe) erected a work at the other ſide, and marched over his infantry, while his cavalry paſſed at a ford on his right; the death of Tilly decided a well-fought action in favour of the King of Sweden, and the

Bavarians

Bavarians loſt 600 men killed, beſides their general.

But as ſtratagem is always preferable to force, we ſhall firſt endeavour to deceive the enemy by feints, and throw over a corps ſufficiently ſtrong to protect the paſſage of the army, wherever he ſhall have left an opening: proper meaſures ſhould be taken to protect the retreat of this corps, ſhould ſuch a thing be neceſſary: that is, works ſhould be conſtructed to cover the bridge, and batteries erected on our own ſide, to make a croſſing fire before it.

We know how the great Marlborough (in 1711, while he, with the grand army (inferior to the French Marſhal Villars in numbers) threatened (in front) their lines extending from Bouchain on the Scheld, along the Senſet and the Scarpe to Arras; and from thence along the Upper Scarpe and the Riviere to the Canche, the opening between thoſe two rivers being well fortified, ordered Lieutenant General Cadogan to take ſome troops from the neighbourhood of Douay and from the Garriſons of Liſle and St. Amand, and to march to Arleux, there to paſs the Senſet and ſeize the paſſes on that river and on the Scheld at Oiſy: this was effected, (the enemy having withdrawn their troops from thoſe poſts) and the duke paſſed the Scarpe near Vitri: thus ſurprizing their boaſted lines, and obliging them to evacuate them without firing a ſhot.

In paſſing other defiles almoſt every thing depends upon ſecuring the openings at the other ſide, for

for which purpoſe a corps is generally ſent forward, to ſeize upon ſome poſt or ſtrong poſition. The longer thoſe defiles the more difficult to paſs; (much more ſo than rivers) particularly if the enemy has fortified himſelf in the paſs, as he muſt be firſt forced there, and the opening at the other ſide ſecured afterwards.

In the winter of 1742, the King of Pruſſia preceded his army, with only 400 huſſars, and four battalions, through the defile of Jedowitz in Moravia, a force which he knew at that time to be ſufficient to ſecure the opening at the other ſide, for the deployment of the army.

I have already ſhewn how Prince Charles of Lorraine, in 1745, loſt the battle of Hohen Friedberg, not having firſt ſecured the openings of the defiles, ſo as to be able to deploy.

To defend a river.

After having deſtroyed the bridges, and brought the boats to our ſide; we poſt troops in all thoſe ſituations, where they can either oppoſe the paſſage of the enemy, or obſerve his motions. If it is neceſſary to keep a bridge ſtanding, it ſhould be well fortified. If we have time to build field works in ſuch ſituations as command the paſſes; they ſhould be ſo conſtructed, that the enemy may be eaſily driven out, ſhould he get poſſeſſion of any of them. We then take poſt behind the river; and follow him in all his movements, either with the whole or a part of the army; or if the river forms a bow projecting from us, we ſhall take a poſition equi-diſtant from all parts of the line of defence, leaving troops poſted on the bank, both

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to watch the enemy and oppoſe him till reinforced. We muſt not then be in a hurry to march upon every alarm; but be very ſure that he is in earneſt before we put the army in motion againſt him. Unleſs we can venture to keep up bridges, and troops poſted at the other ſide, to watch the motions of the enemy; it is almoſt impoſſible to prevent him (if active and vigilant) from paſſing a river of any conſiderable extent.

In the year 1760, Marſhal Daun defended the river Katſbach, in Sileſia, from Parchwitz to Koſſendau (about thirty Engliſh miles) watching his enemy ſo well, and reinforcing the ſeveral poſts ſo judiciouſly, that the great Frederick could never venture to attempt the paſſage in any part.

There is another method of preventing an enemy from paſſing a river; but for which, our army ſhould be nearly equal to his: that is to paſs it ourſelves, and take a good poſition, ſo that he ſhall not dare to attempt it, leſt he ſhould be attacked during the operation: it was thus, that Turenne prevented Montecuculi from entering into Alſace in 1676, when he (Turenne) paſſed the Rhine, at Ottenheim, took up a poſition, with his right at Wilſtaet and his left on Fort Kehl, thus barring Montecuculi from any communication with Straſburgh.

The defence of the Elbe, in 1778, from the mountains of Reiſen Geburge to Konigingratz, by the Emperor Joſeph II. (having Marſhal Lacy under him) was a compound of thoſe two methods; as he not only kept up his bridges, and ſtrong detachments at the other ſide, to watch the movements

Compaign du Roi de Pruſſe de 1778 à 1779, page 107.

movements of the King of Pruſſia; but advanced General Wurmſer, with a large force, over the river at Hohen Elbe, to fall upon Frederick, when he ſeemed by his march to the right, to meditate an attack on the left of the Auſtrian poſition.

The enemy may be prevented from paſſing other defiles in the ſame manner; that is, by watching his motions, and attacking him during the operation, while yet entangled in the defile: as the King of Pruſſia did Prince Charles at Hohen Friedbergh, and the great Condé did the Prince of Orange, (afterwards King William III.) at Senef in 1674. But there is likewiſe another manner: which is, by fortifying the paſs; provided the fortification cannot be turned, or commanded by higher ground.

To retreat over a river.

This is a very difficult operation, in preſence of an enemy, as the army muſt neceſſarily be divided by it; the intention ſhould therefore be concealed if poſſible: however, be it ſo, or not, all baggage, heavy artillery, &c. muſt be firſt ſent over, and placed in ſecurity; a ſtrong poſition taken up in the neighbourhood of the river, and even cloſe to it, if the place where we mean to paſs is not to be concealed; but otherwiſe, ſo that we may march from it into different poſitions at the ſame time, throw over bridges behind them quickly and paſs over. If it is a river, the banks of which at the other ſide are favourable, they ſhould be occupied by troops and artillery, and even field works erected on them: the army will then paſs over without hurry or confuſion, leaving the neceſſary detachments to deſtroy

ſtroy the bridges; who will afterwards paſs over in boats. Upon ſuch occaſions every method ſhould be uſed to deceive the enemy, at leaſt as to the time (as to place, perhaps, not being practicable) but at the ſame time no precaution againſt attack ſhould be neglected. The rear guard ſhould occupy ſuch poſts as can favour the operation, and the army be ready to ſupport it. But when neither the time, nor the place can be kept ſecret, we would poſt ourſelves behind entrenchments, of which there ſhould be ſeveral lines, one within the other; ſo that according as the army became weaker, on this ſide by a part being paſſed over, it ſhould have leſs ground to defend. There is little difference between a retreat over a river and through another defile, except that in this latter caſe, we have no banks at the other ſide, on which to plant troops and batteries; but it may afford ſituations where troops may be poſted, who will ſucceſſively cover each others retreat.

I have already taken notice of the retreat of the Prince of Parma, in 1591, over the Wahl, in preſence of the Dutch army, under Prince Maurice of Naſſau, afterwards Prince of Orange.

The King of Pruſſia in 1778, having in vain tried every art to induce Marſhal Lacy to quit his ſtrong poſition behind the Elbe, and all his attempts to paſs it, being equally fruitleſs, reſolved to retreat from the banks of the Elbe, and to put his army into winter quarters, which he effected with little or no loſs, through a country full of defiles, and the roads very bad, by always previouſly

Campagne du Roi de Pruſſe de 1778 a 1779, page 146.

ouſly crowning with troops and artillery, ſuch heights as commanded the ſeveral paſſes; and on the 17th of September, he ſent his heavy baggage, field bakery, hoſpital, and part of the heavy artillery from his camp at Walſtaet, over the Aupa, under a ſtrong eſcort; on the 18th, at day-break, they were followed by the tents and light baggage, with the remainder of the heavy artillery; and on the ſame day the whole army paſſed over, the infantry on three bridges conſtructed for the purpoſe, and the cavalry by the fords; four batteries were previouſly erected on four heights, which commanded the right bank of that river, and occupied by as many battalions; a brigade of infantry of the line, 200 light infantry, and 400 huſſars formed the rear guard, and deſtroyed the bridges.

Campagne du Roi de Pruſſe le 1778 a 1779, page 163.

About the ſame time Prince Henry determined, likewiſe to retreat from Bohemia into Saxony; and in order to deceive Marſhal Laudon, then encamped and ſtrongly entrenched at Munchengratz, behind the Iſer, and to make him ſuppoſe that he had deſigns upon Prague, he ordered Moellendorf to advance along the right bank of the Elbe, towards that town, as far as Melnick, while Platen puſhed detachments acroſs the Egra to the very walls of Prague. Thoſe manœuvres had the deſired effect, and the Prince paſſed the Elbe near Lentmeritz, almoſt without interruption, Moellendorf's corps forming the rear guard.

In the month of December 1759, the Pruſſian General Diercke, being poſted with ſeven battalions

lions of infantry, and 1000 horſe on the right bank of the Elbe, oppoſite to Meiſſen in Saxony, finding it impoſſible to lay a bridge of pontoons acroſs the river on account of the floating ice, was obliged to tranſport his men in boats; and when all were paſſed, except himſelf with the rear guard, conſiſting of three battalions, he was attacked on the morning of the 3d, by a large body of Auſtrians, and taken priſoner with all his men.

I ſhall ſay nothing of the paſſage of a river in preſence of an enemy on both ſides, it would be a deſperate effort, of which I believe there is no example in hiſtory.

To prevent an enemy from retreating over a defile, we ſhould poſt ourſelves as near him as poſſible, watch his motions narrowly, and hold ourſelves in readineſs to attack him whenever he makes the attempt. To prevent the enemy from retreating over a defile.

By the term, *battle*, is underſtood a general engagement; where only part of the contending armies is engaged, it is called *an affair*, otherwiſe there is no difference. Of battle.

A prudent general never fights when he can attain his object by any other means: therefore before we reſolve to give battle, we ſhould conſider and weigh the advantages likely to accrue from a victory againſt the diſadvantages which may reſult from a defeat, and likewiſe the probability of the ſucceſs. A general gives battle—1ſt, To drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of one of his his chief towns, in order to inveſt it; as the King of Pruſſia fought the battle of Prague, and, after the victory, inveſted that town; and in it Prince When to give battle.

Charles, with the greateſt part of his army.—2d, To prevent the enemy from inveſting a place, or to raiſe the ſiege of one already inveſted, as the Duke of Cumberland attacked Marſhal Saxe at Fontenoy, in order to raiſe the ſiege of Tournay, in 1745.—3d, To cover a ſiege, as Marſhal Saxe did that juſt mentioned; and as the King of Pruſſia fought the battle of Kolin to cover the ſiege of Prague.—4th, To drive the enemy out of a country, or to prevent him from entering it. We ſee the King of Pruſſia, by the victory of Liſſa, oblige the Auſtrians to abandon all Pruſſian, and moſt part of Auſtrian, Sileſia; and the French by the loſs of the battle of Minden, forced to retreat out of the biſhopricks in 1758.—5th, When a general finds himſelf in ſuch a perilous ſituation that nothing but a fortunate battle can extricate him: this was the King of Pruſſia's ſituation in 1760, when he fought and gained the battle of Torgau, againſt Marſhal Daun, though ſuperior to him in number, and ſo ſtrongly poſted as to render it highly imprudent for the King to attack him, had he not been ſo circumſtanced that a defeat could not have made his affairs worſe.—6th, When we expect to be weakened by a defection of ſome of our allies, or that the enemy is likely to receive a reinforcement. Thus we ſee Marſhal Turenne in 1674, haſten, with an inferior force, to attack the Duke of Bournonville, (though ſtrongly poſted at Sintzheim) before he ſhould be reinforced by the Duke of Lorraine, which he hourly expected; and

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we ſee that his judgment and enterprize were crowned with the ſucceſs which they deſerved.

In the year 1762, on the depoſition and death of the Czar Peter III. his widow and ſucceſſor Catharine II. immediately ordered all her troops, then acting in conjunction with the Pruſſians, to march back by the neareſt routes to Ruſſia. The King of Pruſſia, as he could no longer derive any advantage from the arms of the Ruſſians, reſolved to profit by their preſence, and accordingly attacked the right wing of the Auſtrian army poſted on the heights of Buckerſdorf in Sileſia, before they knew any thing of the defection of his allies, by whoſe preſence their left was kept in check. In this affair Frederick took fourteen pieces of cannon, and by diſpoſſeſſing the Auſtrians of the heights of Buckerſdorf and ſome neighbouring villages, he cut off their communication with Schweidnitz, and was enabled to lay ſiege to that place.—7th, We ſhall ſeek to engage the enemy if we ſuſpect a difference of opinion to prevail among his generals: witneſs the advantage which the Duke of Marlborough drew from the diſagreement between the Dukes of Burgundy and Vendome in 1708, when he paſſed the Scheld in their preſence, (which he probably would not have attempted, had he not counted on the above circumſtance) and won the battle of Oudenarde.—8th, We ſhall ſeek a general engagement if our poſition or numbers, or any blunder on the part of the enemy, gives us ſuch a ſuperiority as to promiſe us ſucceſs; and finally, if we know our army

Towers's Frederick III. Vol. II. page 252.

to be ſuperior in diſcipline or manœuvres, which it can only be by the attention and intelligence of the officers of every rank, and the ſteadineſs of the men; it was by this, joined to the reſources of his genius and his perfect knowledge of the military art, that the great Frederick was enabled to win ſo many battles, againſt ſuperior numbers and eminent generals, to preſerve, and even add to his hereditary dominions againſt the united efforts of Auſtria, France, and Ruſſia; and it was by this, that Julius Cæſar conquered the world.

When to avoid fighting.

We ſhall avoid giving battle when it is our intereſt to do ſo: viz. for the following reaſons:—1ſt, When our troops are new, and that we would gain time to diſcipline them.—2d, When our poſition is bad, or we are inferior in number.—3d, When we have reaſon to expect a better opportunity of fighting to advantage; as that the enemy will be obliged to detach, or that we expect a reinforcement, or that he will be obliged to move into ſome ſituation where we can attack him with ſome probability of ſucceſs.—4th, When want of proviſions or forage muſt ſoon oblige him to retreat. In fine, we will avoid a battle when we can loſe more by a defeat, than we can gain by a victory, which is the caſe—1ſt, When the enemy has ſuch poſitions or fortreſſes in his rear, as can prevent our reaping advantage from our ſucceſs, and that we have none to ſtop his progreſs.—2d, When we can render advancing difficult and expenſive to him, by our movements without coming to a general engagement, whereas our defeat might

might render it eaſy. In fine we ſhall avoid giving battle if we can attain our object without it.

In 1599, Prince Maurice of Naſſau declined attacking the Spaniſh troops in Dutch Brabant when preſſed to it by the States, although ſuperior to them both in number and diſcipline, becauſe he knew that want of proviſions would force them to retreat. And we have ſeen Marſhal Lacy in 1778, in his lines behind the Elbe, conſtantly decline advancing from them to give battle to the King of Pruſſia, although ſuperior to him in numbers; while Marſhal Laudon in his camp at Munchengraetz on the Iſer, preſerved the ſame conduct towards Prince Henry; and the royal brothers after many fruitleſs attempts to bring thoſe eminent generals to action, were obliged to retire and take up their winter quarters; the one in Sileſia, the other in Saxony, while the Auſtrian generals attained the object of the campaign, which was the preſervation of Bohemia.

When we reſolve to give battle, we ſhall conſider what advantages we poſſeſs, and endeavour to profit by them: for inſtance, if the enemy is inferior to us in the number or quality of his troops; if he is badly poſted, or has neglected the proper precautions, when in camp or on a march—We have already ſeen Frederick the Great ſurpriſed by Marſhal Daun at Hochkirchen, by not keeping a ſufficient look out; and Prince Charles of Lorraine beat at Hohen-Friedberg before his army could form, he not having previouſly ſecured the

mouths of the defiles—Or if his diſpoſition is injudicious, or his retreat difficult and ours eaſy.

But if we are inferior to the enemy, either in the number or quality of our troops, we ſhall chooſe a ſtrong camp and fortify it; our field of battle muſt be proportioned to our numbers; if we excel in cavalry, we ſhall prefer a plain; if in infantry, a cloſe country; and we ſhall poſt thoſe arms in ſuch a manner, that they can mutually ſupport each other, and the artillery where it can take moſt effect. All poſts which are ſituated in our front, and which might annoy the enemy in his approach, ſuch as houſes, villages, woods, hedges, heights, &c. muſt be ſtrengthened as much as poſſible, and occupied: all the commanders of diviſions, brigades, &c. muſt be fully inſtructed; but above all things the retreat muſt be ſecure: for which it is neceſſary, that there ſhould be no river or defile, immediately in our rear. The general who attacks, takes every poſſible pains to get information; he is generally with the advanced guard, and reconnoitres the enemy previous to making his diſpoſition, and attacks either the whole line of the enemy, with his whole line (which can ſcarcely happen between two great armies) or one or both of the flanks, with one or both of his; or the center with his center; the firſt would be imprudent, as it leaves too much to chance: the attack with both flanks can ſcarcely happen, except we can out-flank the enemy; the echellon attack of one wing is the moſt approved; the attack with the centre ſeems bad,

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as offering two out-jutting angles, which are always weak points; but Lieutenant General Dundas has written ſo fully upon this ſubject, that any thing further from me would be both ſuperfluous and preſumptuous: his book is in the hands of every officer, and its principle ſhould be impreſſed on the minds of every military man; it is only by being maſter of it, that we can ever attain that reputation to which we all aſpire. If the attacking army finds impediments in its way, we muſt conſider what thoſe impediments are, and how they can be avoided or ſurmounted. If they conſiſt of water, moraſſes, ravines, &c. we ſhall endeavour, by a quick movement to the flank or rear of the enemy, to force him to change his poſition, ſo that we may either entirely avoid the difficulties, or paſs them without oppoſition; or, we ſhall endeavour to find ſome part of his line which he has neglected, or where we can approach without being much expoſed to the fire of his batteries; or finally, we ſhall try to ſilence ſome of them, and puſh forward under the protection of our own; in which, as in every other caſe, every thing muſt be ready to open and prepare the ways for the troops; ſo that they may break into columns, paſs the obſtacles, and deploy into line as quickly as poſſible. At the battle of Prague, Prince Charles of Lorraine's front was covered by ravines and moraſſes: the King of Pruſſia marched to the left, paſſed his cavalry over the dam, and attacked the right of the Auſtrian poſition: the victory which enſued is well known. If the obſtacles con-

ſiſt of villages, woods, coppices, heights, &c. in front, in which the enemy has poſted troops, we may, perhaps, avoid them by an oblique attack, or by turning his poſition; but if not, we ſhall diſlodge him with our guns, and then make the attack on his line according to the diſpoſition of the general. Frequently the whole, or a great part of both armies is ſucceſſively engaged in a conteſt for one of thoſe poſts: ſuch was the battle of Lowoſitz, in Bohemia; fought between the King of Pruſſia, and Marſhal Browne, commanding the Auſtrians, in 1756, when the whole of the Auſtrian right wing was ſucceſſively engaged (relieving and reinforcing the troops poſted in the vineyards and village of Lowoſitz) againſt the Pruſſian left; and when the Pruſſians had ſucceeded in gaining poſſeſſion of the poſt, Marſhal Browne had taken up ſo advantageous a poſition behind it, that Frederick did not think it prudent to attack him: but by making a detachment to his right, as if he intended to turn his left flank, he induced Browne to repaſs the Egra, and take up his camp at Budin, and thus relinquiſh his deſign of relieving the King of Poland, and the Saxon army, blockaded in the camp at Pirna. Had Frederick defeated Browne, he might have wintered in Bohemia.

Towers's Frederick III. Vol. I. page 474.

All hedges, corn-fields, ravines, coppices, &c. which can conceal an enemy, muſt be cleared by our light troops, leſt the flanks of our columns ſhould be annoyed by them when advancing to the attack: at the above battle of Lowoſitz, the Pruſſian cavalry ſuffered conſiderably by a flanking fire which the

they received (when charging) from a corps of Croats poſted in ſome vineyards on the right of the village. At the battle of Kollin, a brigade of Pruſſian infantry being galled in flank by ſome Croats (poſted in the meadows through which it was advancing in column) was induced to deviate from its proper direction, in order to drive them away; ſome other bodies regulating their movement by this falſe direction, occaſioned a derangement of the whole plan of attack; an inconvenience which a few ſkirmiſhers being advanced, might have obviated. This was not the fault of the King of Pruſſia, but of the officer who led that brigade.

Attack of a fortified camp.

If we mean to attack a fortified camp, we ſhall firſt examine its weak parts; which may conſiſt in ſome fault committed by the enemy: for inſtance, if the flanks are not ſecured; if ſome of the fortifications are unfiniſhed, or ſo ſituated, that we can approach them without much inconvenience from their fire, if they are commanded by any of the neighbouring grounds: or finally, if he has made a bad diſpoſition of his troops. We ſhall then make our diſpoſition, which conſiſts in the number of attacks; the time they are to take place; which are to be falſe, and which true, the number and order of the troops; and what they are to do in caſe a falſe attack ſhould ſucceed: we deliver to the troops whatever is neceſſary to the undertaking; as hurdles, or faſcines, when wolf-traps or moraſſes are to be paſſed, or to fill up ditches; axes when palliſades are to be attacked or palings paſſed;

paſſed; and in fine, any tools which may be neceſſary. Circumſtances muſt determine whether we ſhall make the attack by night or by day. The night attack has the following advantages; the chance of ſurpriſing the enemy; little to be apprehended from his fire during the approach of the troops; he is more eaſily thrown into confuſion, and our diſpoſition is concealed from him; but it has the following diſadvantages; the columns can eaſily loſe their way, and miſs the proper time and points of attack; we have the moſt dangerous ſort of oppoſition to expect: viz. when the enemy ſtands upon the breaſt work, and with pikes and bayonets, puſh down thoſe who attempt to climb up; confuſion communicates itſelf as eaſily through the aſſailants, as the aſſaulted, and we loſe the advantage which might be derived from a preceding cannonade upon the enemy's works; beſides that, we ſhall not be able to follow up our victory, and render it ſo deciſive as by day. Therefore it would be adviſable to make the attack by night, only when the enemy's troops are either ill-diſpoſed or undiſciplined. But to march and make the diſpoſitions in the night, ſo as to commence the attack at day-break, is to be preferred, as confuſion is thereby avoided, and we have the day before us to follow up the victory.

When we have made our diſpoſitions for the attack, and delivered out the neceſſary tools, utenſils, &c. to the troops; we next examine what obſtacles are to be removed by our artillery, which being effected, the troops advance in columns of

not

not more than two or three battalions, as it is better to make more attacks than to have very deep columns; theſe columns in approaching the enemy's works, take every advantage of the ground, to cover themſelves from his fire: their approach is generally covered by the fire of artillery playing upon thoſe works which defend the points of attack. When arrived on the glacis, leaping into the ditch, and climbing on the breaſt-work, ſhould be as one act; while the foremoſt diviſions are doing this, thoſe who follow protect them by their fire from the glacis; the troops deſtined to ſupport the attack, follow at a proper diſtance. As ſoon as a part has climbed over, the reſt ſhould immediately follow, take poſt within the breaſt-work, turn the guns which they find there, againſt the enemy, and drive him away by a heavy fire; under the protection of this fire, the workmen clear the neareſt entrances, or open new ones, if neceſſary, to admit the following troops. If they conſiſt of Cavalry (which they probably will, if the ground admits of their ſervice) they charge as ſoon as a few ſquadrons have paſſed and formed, and cut down any of the enemy, who may ſtill be inclined to reſiſt. If they conſiſt of infantry, they endeavour always to gain ground, until the different columns of attack unite and form the line.

In 1654, the great Conde, joined with the Spaniards, beſieged Arras with 30,000 men, and the King of France's army, under Marſhal Turenne, did not exceed 14,000. Turenne, however, ſeeing, that there was no chance of ſaving the place, except by attacking the enemy in his lines, reſolved upon

upon the attempt. He therefore drove in his out-poſts, and reconnoitred his lines and the ground in front of them; he examined every part, in order to leave him in uncertainty as to his intended point of attack. The Spaniards expecting to be attacked, added to their fortifications. They had dug a double ditch and double lines, with redoubts between, all furniſhed with artillery; they raiſed epaulements to cover them from the fire of the town, and that of the army; they barred the paſſages with waggons, upſet; dug (in the ſpace between the two lines) twelve rows of wolf-traps, and ſunk ſtakes in the intervals. Notwithſtanding all this, Turenne reſolved to attack, and gave notice to the governor of the town to ſecond him, by a ſortie; he divided the army into three corps, all to make attacks upon the ſame front, leſt by making them upon ſeparate points, each corps depending upon the other, might act with leſs vigour; he determined to make the attack by night, in order that the enemy, not ſeeing any thing, ſhould not venture to draw away troops from any part, to reinforce that attacked: and finally, he alarmed the enemy every where, by ſmall parties of cavalry and infantry, acting ſeparately along their lines. The march was conducted with the greateſt ſilence, by the moſt concealed ways. The center commanded by Marſhal Turenne, in perſon, and the left commanded by Monſieur de la Ferté, arrived at their points of attack before two o'clock in the morning, when a cannon ſhot gave them reaſon to ſuppoſe that they were diſcovered,

Boſroger Principes de la Guerre, page 321.

vered, and they commenced the attack without waiting for the Marſhal de Hoquincourt, who commanded the right, and whoſe guides had led him aſtray. The infantry was formed in two lines, followed by the cavalry, and each detachment had horſemen attached to it to carry faſcines and tools for the infantry, to fill up the ditches, and open the ways. He attacked the trenches, filled the ditches and paſſed them, covered the wolf-traps with hurdles, while the cavalry opened a paſſage for itſelf in another quarter, by forcing a barrier. The Marſhal de Hoquincourt had not arrived at his poſt, and the attack of the Marſhal de la Ferté had failed; but he gave it up immediately to enter the trenches in the ſame place that Turenne had forced them: the conſequence is well known—the Spaniards loſt 7000 men, 64 pieces of cannon, 2000 waggons, 6000 tents, 9000 horſes, and all their baggage, beſides being obliged to raiſe the ſiege of Arras.

In the year 1715, Charles XII. of Sweden, attacked the Prince of Anhalt in the night, immediately after he had landed in the iſland of Kiegen. "The King of Sweden was right in ſo doing, (ſays "the King of Pruſſia) becauſe he wanted to con- "ceal the ſmall number of his men, which would "have been obvious in the day time: he had but "four thouſand men, with which he came to attack "twenty thouſand, and was beaten." At the battle of Malplaquet, the French occupied a very ſtrong entrenched camp; but of which the entrenchments were not perfectly finiſhed when the Duke of Marlborough attacked and carried them. They poſſeſſed the

the woods of Lagniere, La Mert, Taiſniere, and Sarte, and the village of Malplaquet, with the ſurrounding hedges. The cavalry was formed in the intermediate openings. Thoſe advantages they improved by entrenchments, and felled trees on all the ways to obſtruct the approach of the troops. It appears that the main attack was firſt made upon the right of the French in the wood of La Merte, and in an intrenched opening; but that failing, Prince Eugene attacked their left in the wood of Sarte, drove them from it, and opened a paſſage for the cavalry, who paſſed through, formed in the plain, charged, and decided the fate of the day.

How to take advantage of victory.

Having ſucceeded in our attack, whether on an enemy entrenched or otherwiſe, we ſhall cauſe him to be purſued and harraſſed in his retreat, as much as poſſible, by the light troops, while the army follows, or prepares to follow, in good order to ſupport them, until having forced him to retire a ſufficient diſtance, we can lay ſiege to one of his towns, deſtroy ſome of his magazines, or invade ſome of his provinces. Of courſe, we ſhall not omit to detach troops to cut off his retreat, by ſeizing on the defiles in his rear, if he has neglected to occupy them. But at all events, we can harraſs him in his retreat through them. But it is proper we ſhould guard againſt misfortune, and be prepared for every event. Therefore the retreat muſt be thought of in time, in caſe we ſhould fail in our attack.

Retreat after a battle.

For this purpoſe, the roads in our rear ſhould be repaired and widened as much as poſſible; and all heights, woods, incloſures, houſes, and villages, which

which are ſituated within muſket-ſhot of them, ſhould be occupied by troops, and furniſhed with guns, in order that the army may retreat in ſafety under their protection; but care muſt be taken that thoſe troops are not cut off when they have fulfilled their object.

Thoſe precautions being taken, the guns are ſent off: it may ſometimes be neceſſary to ſacrifice a few guns, particularly if they are mounted on a battery which protects the retreat of the army, but cannot be turned eaſily againſt it by the enemy. If there is any defile in the rear, thoſe poſts ſhould be ſufficiently ſtrong to be able to reſiſt, until the rear of the army has got into it. The troops follow the artillery; and, if the country is interſected, the cavalry leading: but, if open, the infantry retreats firſt, and the cavalry covers it, by taking a poſition to fall upon the flank of the purſuing enemy. Thoſe troops which have ſuffered leaſt generally compoſe the rear guard; the infantry of which relieves, and draws in upon it all the troops occupying the poſts already mentioned. The rear guard occupies the mouth of a defile, or ſome other ſtrong poſition to cover the retreat of the army by which it is reinforced, if neceſſary.

Fortified camps and their defence.

The ſituation of the camp is the firſt thing to be conſidered, if it can be turned, or is deficient in wood or water, the army cannot long remain in it; the flanks muſt be therefore well ſupported.

The ſimpleſt method of fortifying a camp is by a parapet, with a ditch running along the front, flanked by fleches (which then take the name of redans

redans) at proper diſtances, generally two hundred toiſes: but this method is very defective, as all the fire is collected in front of the curtain, and none before the redans. Upon this ſubject the King of Pruſſia ſays, "Your greateſt ſecurity will "ariſe from a ſkilful obſervance of certain maxims "in fortification, by which you make the front of "attack as little extenſive as poſſible, and oblige "the enemy to make his aſſault in thoſe parts "which are beſt flanked and defended."

Military Inſtructions, page 120.

He likewiſe recommends an entrenchment, conſiſting of ſaliant and re-entering redoubts: the ſaliant redoubts at not more than ſix hundred paces from each other, in order that the fire of their muſketry may croſs; the re-entering redoubts are at a ſimilar diſtance in their rear, covering their intervals, and forming right angles with them, ſo as to flank and defend them: they are joined to them by a trench and parapet.

When the works of a fortified camp are connected by a curtain, there ſhould be ſeveral paſſages of (at leaſt) thirty feet wide through it for the troops to march out and improve any advantage which they may have gained over the enemy: thoſe paſſages may be cloſed by chevaux-de-frize, which are eaſily removed. They are ſometimes covered by fleches on the outſide, or traverſes on the in, either of which affords an obſtacle to the troops marching out, and ſhould be avoided: the outward angles of the above redoubts muſt be to the enemy. But all camps, fortified by connected works, have this diſadvantage, that the enemy may make

make what movements he pleaſes in front of them with impunity, from the difficulty of marching out of them; and even when repulſed, he cannot be much moleſted in his retreat.

A camp fortified by its own natural ſtrength and unconnected works, is therefore to be preferred; and ſuch have been moſt of the modern fortified camps. Thoſe works ſhould be conſtructed according to the rules of fortification, ſo as to be capable of defending themſelves, and the ſpace between by a croſſing fire. The works are manned in proportion to their extent, the troops formed two deep behind the parapet, with reſerves to ſupport them, and the army in the rear to act according to circumſtances. The roads in the rear of the camp ſhould be wide, and kept in good repair, ſo that the army may meet with no obſtruction, if it ſhould be neceſſary to retreat.

There are many obſtacles which may be placed in the way of an enemy coming to attack the army, ſuch as * wolf-traps, abatiſes, ſlader-mines, &c. but which ſhould be learned by ſtudying field fortification.

When ſeveral fortified camps cover a frontier, good and ſpacious roads ſhould be made along their line, and alſo from the camp of the grand army to each of them. It was by means of excellent roads that Marſhal Lacy was enabled to oppoſe Frederick the Great upon the Elbe, in every point where he ſhewed a diſpoſition to paſs.

* Trous des loups.

Lines of Circumvallation.

Lines of circumvallation were formerly much in uſe with beſieging armies, but are now laid aſide. It is true that they rendered it very difficult for the beſieged to receive relief, by detachments ſlipping into the town; but then they rendered the retreat of the beſiegers very dangerous in caſe of a ſucceſsful attack by the enemy on the outſide: witneſs the fate of the Spaniards before Arras, already mentioned, when attacked by Turenne, in 1654; and that of the French before Turin, in 1706, when Prince Eugene carried their lines of circumvallation, (which were ſeparated by the Doire) and took all their artillery and camp equipage. Sieges are now generally covered by an army of obſervation; but, if not, it is thought better to march againſt the enemy with the greateſt part of the army, ſhould he advance to attempt to raiſe the ſiege. It was thus that Marſhal Saxe acted, when he fought the battle of Fontenoy: he had marked out, and fortified his field of battle with detached works, previouſly; and it was thus that Frederick the Great acted when beſieging Prague in 1757, he attacked Count Daun at Kolin, and was beat.

I have already ſaid that the camp ſhould be proportioned to the number of men who are are to occupy it. The battle of Breſlaw, where Prince Charles of Lorraine paſſed the Lake by main force, and beat the Ruſſians, commanded by the Duke of Bevem, proves the truth of this maxim. Colonel Templehoffe, ſpeaking of the above battle, ſays, "The chief cauſes of our loſing the battle,

"ſeem

" ſeem to me to have been the great extent of our " entrenchments, and the ſuperiority of the enemy's " artillery; for we had but very few with the army, " except ſome light three pounders attached to the " battalions. Hence it was impoſſible to prevent " the enemy from croſſing the river."

Cantonments and Winter Quarters.

An army is ſaid to be in cantonments when the troops are merely put into the neighbouring villages and towns, to ſhelter them from the ſeverity of the weather.

In winter quarters, they are more extended for the purpoſe of refreſhing and recruiting them after the fatigues of the campaign.

An army in winter quarters ſhould be ſo ſituated as to be able to aſſemble at a given point before it can be attacked, and ſo that none of the quarters can be carried by the enemy.

As horſes cannot keep the field in very ſevere weather, the cavalry is often ſent into cantonments or quarters, before the infantry. In this caſe, its quarters ſhould be covered by the camp of the infantry, in ſuch a manner as to ſecure them from ſurprize, ſo that either by the diſtance of the out-poſts, the natural obſtacles of the ground, or the reſiſtance of the infantry, poſted between it and the enemy, it may have time to aſſemble and march to the point where it can act with moſt effect before the enemy can arrive. When the General ſees that it is no longer his intereſt to keep the field, the whole army marches into winter quarters, that is, when he cannot penetrate farther into

the enemy's country without firſt taking a town, the ſiege of which the ſeverity of the weather prevents; when no poſt or paſs remains for him to take, the poſſeſſion of which may forward his views at the opening of the campaign, or which is neceſſary to cover his quarters, or, when no conſiderable advantage is to be reaped from keeping the field, when our ſtrong towns are well provided: when our quarters are ſo ſituated, that the enemy cannot undertake any thing againſt them with effect, or at leaſt without riſking the ruin of his own army.

Beſides which we muſt wait until he goes into winter quarters, which often prolongs the campaign to a late ſeaſon.

The army generally takes up its winter quarters in order of battle: the right wing on the right, and the left on the left; the cavalry in the rear, as it cannot be ſafe in villages near the enemy. The light troops are poſted in front, and on the flanks, protected by field works.

The army is generally covered by a river, or chain of mountains, the paſſes of which (on the near ſide) are fortified, and guarded by light infantry, which has light dragoons attached to it for patroling. The patroles from thoſe poſts are frequent, but conſiſt of few men: they approach the enemy as near as poſſible, and give information of any movement of his troops; but, as their intelligence muſt be deficient, ſpies (within his quarters) are always employed, who may ſometimes give expeditious information by certain ſignals.

The

The extent of an army in winter quarters ſhould not exceed thirty-two miles from right to left, and front to rear, ſo that the army may not have more than one day's march to make, in order to aſſemble in the center; and there ſhould be no defile or obſtacle to prevent an eaſy communication.

The winter quarters of the King of Pruſſia, in the years 1778—9, may ſerve as an example. The army, under the command of the Hereditary Prince (now Duke) of Brunſwick, had its quarters in Pruſſian Sileſia, their extremities being Ratibor, Troppau, and Jagerndorf; the two laſt being put in the beſt ſtate of defence. Another corps, under General Tauenzein, occupied the country from near Jagerndorf to the boundary of the county of Glatz, where the corps of General Wunſch begun, and joining that of General Ramin in Middle Sileſia, ended near Grieſenbergh, not far from the borders of Luſatia. The King eſtabliſhed his head quarters at Breſlau, where the foot guards lay; the gardes du corps and genſdarmes were quartered in and about Ohlau. Prince Henry's army was diſtributed as follows: Platen's corps, from Dippolſwald to Kemnitz; Mollendorf's from Freybergh to Buckersdorf; while the Prince of Anhalt Bernburgh diſtributed the Saxons from the Elbe to the quarters of Podjuſky's corps, which had its left at Greifenbergh. None of the above corps occupied a ſpace equal to that mentioned above, and yet each was of ſufficient ſtrength to ſuſtain itſelf, while thoſe next to it would have fallen

Campagne du Roi de Pruſſe de 1778 a 1779, page 219.

fallen upon the flank and rear of the enemy who ſhould attack it.

For the detail of duty in winter quarters, I ſhall refer the reader to Lindenau's Winter Poſterungen, (tranſlated by the Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel Lindſay, in his Military Miſcellany) who is very explicit on the ſubject. As the object of this ſketch is not to give inſtruction, but to point out the ſources from which it may be drawn.

Winter Campaigns.

Winter expeditions are attended with ſuch inconvenience to troops, that they are never undertaken without mature deliberation.

If the undertaking is againſt one of the main poſts of the enemy, we muſt firſt conſider, if by loſing it, the enemy will be obliged to abandon all his quarters; or if we can maintain our ground in it, and from thence puſh further forward; and, finally, if the buſineſs is ſo certain that it is worth while to undertake it, merely for the ſake of cutting off the troops. Having determined on the expedition, we ſhall (having inſured our own retreat) endeavour to ſurprize the place, and poſt either a part of our detachment, or even the whole, between it and the enemy's army, both, becauſe by that means we ſhall the more effectually prevent the troops from eſcaping, and likewiſe becauſe, being attacked in the rear, they will make leſs reſiſtance.

On the 1ſt of October, 1761, General Laudon ſurprized Schweidnitz. The troops employed on this expedition advanced with ſuch precaution, that they

ſcaled

ſcaled the four out-works at the ſame time, and the garriſon had ſcarcely time to fire a few cannon ſhot; the Auſtrians did not fire one. Having thus carried the out-works, they entered the body of the place by burſting open the gates, and made the governor and garriſon priſoners of war.

An expedition of this ſort is ſeldom undertaken without ſome reaſon to ſuppoſe that the duty is neglected, or but looſely performed in the quarter, otherwiſe the troops could not approach it without being diſcovered.

To induce us to make a general attack on the quarters of the enemy, we muſt have reaſon to expect, either to drive him out of them, to cut off a part of his army, or to ſurprize them; all which muſt ariſe from faults committed by him, either in not having properly occupied ſome ſtrong poſts, which we may turn to advantage: by extending his quarters too much; occupying them injudiciouſly, or not keeping a proper look out; or we may make a general attack to relieve one of our towns, incloſed within his cordon, and which he has not yet had time to take.

When a winter expedition is intended, the troops are drawn as cloſe together as poſſible in their cantonments, and march in as many columns as the country will admit to the point of attack.

The winter campaign of Marſhal Turenne, in Alſace, in 1674, when he beat up the quarters of the Elector of Brandenburgh, and drove him out of that province, is one of the moſt admired.

But

But all the ability and enterprize of the beſt general, joined to the greateſt bravery of the officers and men will loſe much of the effect to be expected from them, if the troops are not well trained, and the officers perfectly maſters of the ſyſtem of manœuvre, without which they can never poſſeſs the cool confidence ſo neceſſary to enſure victory, and repair the misfortune of defeat. I ſhall here quote the battle of Liſſa as an example of its advantages, where the King of Pruſſia, with an army of about 28,000 men, beat the Auſtrian army, conſiſting of at leaſt 80,000.

On the 4th of December, 1775, the army moved at break of day from Parkwitz, and marched in the following order:—The van-guard conſiſted of four battalions of grenadiers, eight of infantry, eight hundred volunteers from the whole army at their head, all the light infantry and huſſars—except one regiment, and three regiments of dragoons, with a battery of ten twelve pounders. The army followed in four columns, marching from the right by wings: the flank columns conſiſting of cavalry, and the two centre of infantry; the heavy artillery followed the centre columns in two brigades; three battalions covered the baggage, and a regiment of huſſars had the rear guard. On the 5th, the army again marched, leaving the baggage with three battalions, at Newmark.

A corps of Auſtrian and Saxon huſſars and dragoons was ſurprized near Borna, by the van-guard. —During this attack the columns continued their march,

march, their heads being perfectly dreſſed, and the diviſions preſerving their intervals as exactly as at a review.

The King lead on his army in cloſe columns, (the march being in front) and found the enemy ſtronger than he expected on their right, immediately counter-marched his columns, (by which manœuvre the Auſtrians were deceived, and ſuppoſed him retreating) marched to the right in open column, gained their left, formed two lines, the cavalry on the flanks, made the attack in echellon of battalions fifty paces behind each other to refuſe the left wing, conſtantly out-flanking them, a part of the cavalry attacked their's in front, while the dragoons of Bareuth fell upon their left flank, the echellons formed up one after another, and a complete victory was gained.

Poſting Artillery.

The fire of artillery proceeding from the guns in a direct line upon the enemy's front, is the leaſt dangerous; that upon the flank of his line the moſt effectual; that upon his rear, though not more deſtructive than upon the front, has a great effect upon the imagination of the men, and is very apt to ſtrike him with panic.—The fire which proceeds from ſeveral points, and meets at one place, is the moſt deſtructive. Therefore, the following may be conſidered as rules:—Firſt, We will endeavour to bring our guns to bear upon the enemy's rear, which, however, ſeldom happens, therefore we we ſhall place them on his flank, and enfilade his line, or at leaſt endeavour to obtain an oblique fire.

—Second, We ſhall try to unite the fire of ſeveral batteries, at the point where it will produce the greateſt effect. We ſhall endeavour to ſilence his guns by diſmounting them, or killing the artilleriſts, or to unite our fire at the point which is our object, or where we obſerve his troops to be crouded together; as batteries naturally attract the enemy's fire, no troops ſhould be poſted very cloſe to them, but thoſe which are deſtined to ſupport them ſhould be placed a little behind, or at one ſide, and as much ſcreened as poſſible.

The enfilading battery which the King of Pruſſia eſtabliſhed in the opening of the Auſtrian line, won the battle of Prague.

As to the battle of Liſſa, the Auſtrians having got into great confuſion, were at one place near a windmill, near one hundred men deep, of which the Pruſſian artillery took advantage.

I have thus endeavoured to illuſtrate every military maxim by ſome hiſtorical fact, but refrained from entering into the minute detail, which would be neceſſary to give a perfect idea of the operations and battles which I have quoted, for the reaſon which I have already mentioned, viz. that I do not pretend to give information on the ſubject, but merely to indicate ſome of the ſources from which it may be drawn.

THE END.

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An Army with out posts of Hussars.



Pl.1.

Military Instructions Pl.14.

Neale sc.352 Strand.

An Army with its Out-posts in a Country partly open & partly enclosed.



Pl. 2.

Scale of English Miles.

0 1 2 3

A Convoy marching through an enclosed Country.

Pl.3



Pl.4

A Convoy marching over a Plain.